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Introduction 
Due to its importance to food security and employment, the agricultural sector is a source of international conflict 
and inherently vulnerable to shocks and insecurities in the past and present (Henson and Loader 2001: 86). 
Accordingly, nation-states view respective domestic agricultural sectors as an exception, which merits protectionism 
and which needs protection from the rigors of free market forces and international competition without incurring 
heavy social, economic and political costs. For that matter, states traditionally impose protectionist measures to 
guard domestic agricultural sectors from external shocks.  Paradoxically, the implementation of widespread 
protectionist measures has led to increasing volatilities in the supply and demand of agricultural commodities, e.g. 
by causing subsidized surplus stock (Friedmann 1982: 86). Against the backdrop of deep structural frictions and the 
implementation of pervasive protectionist measures, intergovernmental organizations aim to liberalize the global 
governance1 of trade in agriculture. 
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1995 of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the 
consequent adaption of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
Agreement) and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS Agreement), have 
increasingly institutionalized the global governance of trade in agriculture. The establishment of the AoA, with the 
replacement of GATT by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, constitutes a framework regulating the 
trade in global agriculture, placing a heavy emphasis on the liberalization of agricultural markets and the abolition of 
tariffs and export subsidies - predominantly invoked by developed countries (Gonzales 2002: 439). SPS and TBT 
Agreements regulate the administration of appropriate health and technical standards, which are subject to oversight 
by the WTO. The WTO also arbitrates international trade disputes and therefore hosts the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism (DSM), enabling states to issue legal complaints against other states engaging in unfair trade practices 
(Josling et al 1999: 11).  
1Here, global governance refers to the way in which global affairs pertaining to trade in agriculture are managed. As there is no 
global government, global governance typically involves a range of actors including states, as well as regional and international 
organizations. However, a single organization may nominally be given the lead role on an issue, for example the World Trade 
Organization in world trade affairs. Thus global governance is thought to be an international process of consensus-forming which 





Figure 1: Global Governance of Trade in Agriculture  
                                         
The establishment of the WTO and the ratification of the AoA aimed at the re-construction of the global governance 
of agriculture and food by inducing a global level-playing field. Due to the implementation of policies geared 
towards the liberalization of international trade, overall tariffs are increasingly reduced (Henson and Loader 2001: 
87, Hoekman et al 2003: 182, Cadot and Gourdon 2012: 4). Policy advocates accord the reduction of tarifs to the 
WTO and regard it as a victory. Although consensus exi ts that global tariffs on goods are widely disbanded, the 
agricultural sector appears particular resilient to tariff reductions, when compared with other sectors such as the 
manufacturing one (Tokarick 2003: 17, Gibson et al 2001: iii). With the decline of tariffs, literature suggests that 
states search for alternative mechanisms to substitte protectionist effects historically achieved with the application 
of tariffs. Scholarly research points to the implementation of non-tariff measures (NTMs) as one of the most 
important policy tools to do so (Limao and Venables 2001: 451, Weybrock and Xia 2000: 235, Basu et al 2012: 1). 
Thus, NTMs constitute an ever more important measure to deter imports from third parties invoked by national 
governments.  
 There are three shortcomings with this observation when addressing the global governance of agriculture and food. 
Firstly, evidence that the deployment of NTMs increas s as a response of the decline of tariffs is not proven. States 
make continuous use of tariffs to protect domestic agricultural industries, especially within sectors that are of 
particular sensitivity2 towards domestic industry interests. Secondly, methodologies to measure the effect of tariffs 
and NTMs predominantly analyze cases in aggregate and at the state level, ignoring any legal trade-frameworks that 
                                                   
2A sensitive import usually has a pivotal role in the domestic sector of the importing country. Imports represent a threat to 
sensitive products because they are very susceptibl to competition. However, there is no pre-determined or official list on what 













affect bilateral or regional trade mechanisms. Lastly, this narrative is state-centric and treats the evolution of NTMs 
as a given, with no alternative policy maneuvering possible but the substitution of tariffs by NTMs. An exclusively 
state-centric approach fails to account for the role f alternative actors, such as private actors in the form of 
transnational corporations, which exercise an increasingly important role in the regulation of agricultural trade, for 
example by issuing private standards.  
In order to address the aforementioned three shortcomings (NTMs as substitute for tariffs; ignorance of 
contextualized legal frameworks; state-centralism) and to make a wider contribution to academic ideas pertaining to 
the global governance of food and agriculture, this study is divided into two distinct, but interrelated, parts. The first 
part consists of a quantitative case study of agricultural exports from South Africa to the European Uion (EU) and 
addresses the criticism that NTMs act as a substitute for tariffs. It also advocates for methodologies to put a greater 
focus on the trade context as opposed to only performing studies in aggregate. South Africa is the EU’s largest 
trading partner in Africa with substantial and varied agricultural exports (Gonzalles-Melado 2011: 28). As stated by 
Disdier et al (2008: 341), exports from developing or middle-income countries are widely subjected to NTMs by 
developed countries.  Thus, a case study of the EU and South Africa is suitable to illustrate that, in this particular 
case, NTMs are not substituted for tariffs to act as protectionist tools. In addition, I illustrate tha  it is important to 
consider the legal dimension in any given trade context as trade does not take place in a vacuum or level playing 
field for all parties involved. South Africa and the EU trade under a free trade agreement (FTA) in place since 2000, 
aimed at phasing out tariffs and other measures impeding fair trade between both partners. Deploying the concept of 
the international food regime, I show that the lega dimension of the governance of global agricultural t de is 
geared towards institutionalizing historical advantages by the EU vis-à-vis South Africa. The EU continues to 
protect sensitive domestic industries in which South Africa also has a competitive advantage (e.g. in wi e and 
spirit). Thus, I demonstrate that analyzing the lega  trade dimension in context gives important insights into the 
governance of agricultural trade. 
The second part of the study addresses the criticism that the global governance of trade in agriculture represents an 
issue area that is dominated by national governments o ly. Departing from my case study of South African 
agricultural exports to the EU, I introduce the argument that private entities in the form of transnational corporations 




specifically agrofood corporations, exercise growing power and authority within this policy area via the issuance of 
private standards. I deploy the concept of “private uthority”  Hall and Biersteker (2002) propose, to illustrate that 
the issuance of private standards is a de facto policy tool available to private actors, which needs to be taken into 
consideration when conceptualizing the global governance of trade in agriculture. Thus, it is possible to account for 
wider trends within the global governance of agriculture and food. To give coherence to the overall study, and to 
link both parts to a wider conceptual framework, I deploy a common theoretical background throughout the entire 
study. The concept of the “international food regime”, developed by Friedmann (1982) and McMichael (1994), is 
used to explain developments within the global governance of agriculture, away from the state and towards grofood 
corporations.    
The study proceeds as follows and begins with a literature review. The literature review initially outlines the 
theoretical entry point drawn from prevailing literature on the international political economy of agri-food systems, 
the concept of the international food regime. This approach is then used throughout the study to map out how public 
institutions (i.e. the EU) deploy trade policy tools available to them in a fashion that benefits domestic industries, 
rather than due to pressure to liberalize via the WTO. Having established a theoretical background applicable to the 
entire study, the literature review proceeds to look at the importance of tariffs and NTMs in regulating agricultural 
trade. Hereby, I particular scrutinize methodologies to measure the role of tariffs and NTMs as protectionist tools.  
Following the literature review, I execute a case study of agricultural exports from South Africa to the EU. In order 
to do so, I start the second chapter with a brief description of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) regulating EU-
internal and external agricultural trade by positioning its mechanism within the wider theoretical framework 
deployed (international food regime). The second part rovides a brief historical overview of trade relations, 
specifically agricultural ones, between the EU and South Africa. The third chapter consists of a quantit tive analysis 
assessing whether the EU uses tariffs and/or NTMs to protect sensitive domestic industries and concludes that only 
tariffs are used as protectionist tools, with the deployment of NTMs being non-discriminatory. Within the fourth and 
last chapter, I propose the argument that the issuance of private standards by agrofood corporations is consistent 
with the theoretical background deployed throughout the study and that the global governance of trade in agriculture 
should not be conceptualized as exclusively state-centric. This section consists of an introduction to the argument 




entities act as key players in the global governance of agri-food systems. It primarily aims at pointing to future 
research needs in the study of the global governance of agriculture that departs from an exclusively state-centric 
view, rather than giving an exhaustive account of this argument.  Moreover, the chapter finishes with a summary 
highlighting the main study findings and concludes that deploying the concept of the international food regimes 
helps to generate insights into the global governance of trade in agriculture that is consistent with empirical findings. 
Literature Review  
A Theoretical Entry Point: the International Food Regime 
Friedmann (1982) and McMichael (1989, 1984) developd the concept of the international food regime in the 1980s 
and offer a trajectory of capitalism by looking at the historical construction of the international food order 
(Richardson 2009: 676). Friedmann (1982: 31) defines a food regime as “the rule-governed structure of production 
and consumption of food on a world scale.” According to Friedmann (1982: 31), the creation of an institutionalized 
international food regime took place in 1947 with the establishment of GATT enabling the agricultural sector to 
largely self-regulate. Self-regulation takes place via implicit rules shaped by the exercise of power and property 
across nations, reflecting changing balances of power among states, organized national lobbies, classes (farmers, 
workers, and peasants) and capital.  Established rul s governing the international food regime lead to the production 
of a stable pattern of power, which prioritizes regulations by national governments and focuses on the US and 
Europe (Friedmann 1982: 32). Trade-distorting mechanisms, such as export subsidies and import controls, are 
manifestations of power integral to the global food regime (Friedmann 1982: 32). Henceforth, the US and Europe 
managed to produce surplus stock of many staple crops during the 1970s, such as grain and wheat, which in return 
they sold cheaply to developing nations, posing difficulties for the construction of domestic industries which could 
not compete with artificially low prices (Friedmann 1982: 31).  
 
Historically, the international food regime marks periods of crisis (conflict) and transitions. The first crisis affecting 
the international food regime coincided with the Oil Crisis of the early 1970’s. During this crisis there was a sudden 
and unexpected shift from surplus agricultural products to scarcity due to the sustained increases in the price of 
agricultural inputs. The culture of exports subsidies and import bans led, yet again, to the return of excess surplus 




1982: 70). The period following the 1970’s constitutes the rise of transnational corporations outgrowing national 
regulatory frameworks that gave rise to them in the first place, by controlling international value chains inherent to 
the large-scale industrialization of the agricultural sector (McMicheal 2002: 4).  Agrofood corporations became the 
major agents attempting to regulate conditions of the international food regime in order to maximize planning 
security, investments and profits (Friedmann 1982: 52). In addition, the 1980s are characterized by the p ase of 
Détente between the US and the Soviet Union, the rise of large-scale agricultural production in indiviual countries 
of the “Third World”, such as Brazil, as well as increased competition between surplus stock of the US and Europe 
(Friedmann 1982: 35). McMichael locates the third an last crisis to date within the global Financial Crisis of 2008 
(McMichael 2009: 1).  The confluence of a number of factors sparked this most recent crisis. Most importantly, the 
continued dependency on fossil fuel and the newly established push for biofuel produce inflation and financial 
speculation and are the substantial factors cited to contribute to the last crisis (McMichael 2009: 2).  Additionally, 
McMichael (2009: 2) argues that transactions pertaining to trade in agriculture and international trade in general, 
continue to take place under a regime of neoliberal policies and monopolies of price mechanisms (McMicheal 2009: 
2).  
Friedmann (1993: 29) argues that the establishment of the WTO extends corporate power vis-à-vis nationl 
governments and public institutions. This study takes this theoretical assumption as a starting point and develops the 
idea that the establishment of an international legal trade framework, administered by the WTO, constitutes a crucial 
conjecture in the formation of a modern-day international food order and regime. The international food regime 
allows for the implementation of tariffs under the regulation of the WTO, as well as the management of NTMs. 
States issue NTMs and tariffs and I demonstrate that the deployment of tariffs constitutes an important policy tool to 
deter agricultural imports from third parties.  At the same time, I use the concept as a method to illustrate how the 
provision of a public good, such as the regulation of quality and safety measures, is not a policy space limited to the 
state, but that corporations also yield  influence within this policy space.   
History of Tariffs and Non-Tariff Measures  
This study concentrates and contributes to aspects of the international food regime that deal with theestablishment 
of an international food order and the role of the implementation of the legal trade framework in which private 
actors are important agents. The precursor to the WTO, the GATT, was established in 1947 and demarcates the start 




GATT into the WTO takes place during the second phase of the international food regime. The establishment of the 
WTO is a pivotal landmark in re-stabilizing global agricultural markets via the reform of trade rules (McMichael 
2009: 294). The inception of the WTO accelerated the abolition of tariffs and also institutionalized the 
administration of public NTMs, such as health and safety standards. The aim was to harmonize standards globally in 
order to prevent abuse and facilitate transparency of trade between nations (Cadot and Gourdon 2012: 3). The TBT 
Agreement ensures that technical regulations, i.e. standards, testing and certification procedures are applied on a 
scientific basis without unnecessary obstruction of trade. The SPS Agreement relates to the assurance of animal and 
plant health, i.e. controlling for bacteria, pesticides used, inspection and labeling. Oversight of the implementation of 
the TBT and SPS Agreement lies with three intergovernm ntal bodies, the Codex Alimentarius Commission 
(Codex), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection 
Convention (IPPC).  
Definition of Non-Tariff Measures  
Scholars propose various definitions for NTMs over the last decades. The most basic definition of NTMs entails so-
called “border effects”. Border effects refer to regulations which goods need to fulfill to cross borders, such as SPS 
and TBT standards (Disdier et al 2008: 339). The deployment of publicly issued border effects is supervised by the 
WTO and its corresponding agreements. In addition, the most inclusive definitions of NTMs include so-called 
“beyond-the-border-effects.” Domestic shortcomings, such as poor infrastructure and inefficient administrative 
capacities, constitute beyond the border effects and refer to impediments to exports (Cadot and Gourdon 2012: 3). 
The establishment of the Multiple Agencies Support Team (MAST) in 2007 is an institutional effort to set up a 
common taxonomy for NTMs with. An array of international agencies (World Bank, UNCTAD, International Trade 
Centre, Food and Agricultural Organization, Organiztion for Economic Cooperation and Development, United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization, International Monetary Fund, and WTO) set up MAST to harmonize 
research and analysis on the impact of NTMs. The MAST team proposes that NTMs are measures that affect 
imports (such as regulations and standards) and subsidize exports. Hereby, NTMs are largely divided into technical 
(e.g. sanitary and phytosanitary standards) and non-technical measures (e.g. intellectual property rights, rules of 
origin3, etc.). However, this approach classifies any regulation in place as a NTM, although most regulations relating 
                                                   
3 Rules of origin are the criteria needed to determine the national source of a product. Their importance is derived from the fact 





to health and safety concerns are put in place due to g nuine concerns that are backed by scientific research. Beghin 
and Bureau (2001: 109) acknowledge that for a regulation or a standard to act as a NTM, it must be deploy d with 
the primary intention to protect national producers. Thus, NTMs are tools predestined to be protectionist measures 
due to a lack of transparency regarding their legitimacy.  Dell’Aquila et al (2007: 270) acknowledge that there are 
often disputes in regards to determining which NTMs are necessary and legitimate and which are not.  
Mahé raises another issue concerning a broad definition of NTMs (cited in Beghin and Bureau 2001:108). Mahé 
suggests that only NTMs that have a welfare distorting effect4 should classify as trade barriers and NTMs that do not 
cause welfare distortions should not classify as barriers. Hereby, it is irrelevant whether NTMs are issued due to 
legitimate concerns or whether they are deployed with the sole intention to restrict imports, as long as overall 
welfare distortions do not occur. Disdier et al (2008: 336) go as far as to say that certain regulations and standards 
can actually have a positive effect on exports because they signal to consumers that products are safe. This effect, 
however, is only valid as long as accompanying regulations and standards in question do not have a trade impeding 
effect, i.e. prohibiting greater imports.  
 
This study deploys a definition of NTMs that is more restrictive in its application by referring to NTMs solely as 
“border effects”, i.e. by referring to measures that are imposed by the importing country on exports of third-parties. 
Hillman (1991) and Beghin and Bureau (2001: 108) support this definition in stating that NTMs are all restrictions 
other than traditional tariffs (cited in Beghin and Bureau 2001: 108).  A more restrictive definition f a NTM is 
deployed in this study because I am only interested in so- called “border effects” and not “beyond the border 
effects.” In addition, this study has a limited scope and it is unfeasible to determine which NTMs are issued solely as 
protectionist measures and which are not. Similarly, welfare distorting effects are irrelevant to the scope of my 
study, which is why I do not accommodate Mahé’s criticism of NTM’s effect on welfare distributions.  
 
 
                                                   
4Welfare economics is a branch of economics that focuses on the optimal allocation of resources and goods and how this affects 
social welfare. Welfare economics analyzes the total good or welfare that is achieved at a current stae as well as how it is 
distributed.  Welfare economics uses the perspective and techniques of microeconomics, but they can be aggregated to make 
macroeconomic conclusions. Because different "optimal" states may exist in an economy in terms of the allocation of resources, 










Technical Measures Examples 
A Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Restricted use of certain substances  
B Technical Barriers to Trade Traceability information required  
C 
Pre-shipment Inspections and other 
Formalities 
Requirement to pass through specific port  
Non-Technical Measures 
D Contingent Trade Protective Measures Antidumping duty 
E Non-Automatic Licensing, Quotas  Licensing for pre-specified use  
F 
Price-Control Measures Incl. Additional 
Taxes and Charges  
Voluntary export price restraints  
G Finance Measures  Regulations on foreign exchange mechanism  
H Measures Affecting Competition  Compulsory use of national services  
I Trade Related Investment Measures  Trade balancing measures  
J Distribution Restrictions  Restrictions on resellers  
K Restrictions on Post-Sales Services  Post-sales need to be administered by local entity  
L Subsidies  Financial support  
M Government Procurement Restrictions  Buying national products only  
N Intellectual Property  Trademark restrictions  
O Rules of Origin  Proof that product originated in specified county  
Exports P Export-Related Measures  Export prohibition  
Source: UNCTAD 2012 
Defining Tariffs  
The definition of a tariff is straightforward, as a tariff is a widely used protectionist trade tool. In the most basic 
sense, a tariff is a customs tax levied on imported commodities based on the monetary value of the import (ad-
valorem tariff) (MAcMap Glossary). Next to ad-valorem tariffs, there are four other types of tariffs called non-ad-
valorem tariffs (NAs), which are all more complicated to administer and quantify than an ad-valorem tariff. For 
example, a specific tariff is related to the measure  of weight, volume, and surface or similar. It sets out how many 
units of currency are to be levied per unit of quantity (e.g. 5EUR per liter) (MAcMap Glossary). A compound tariff, 
on the other hand, is comprised of an ad-valorem duty to which a specific additional duty is subtracted or added (e.g. 
5% plus 5EUR per liter) (MAcMap Glossary). A mixed tariff is based on a conditional choice between an ad-
valorem duty and a specific duty subject to an upper (c iling) and/or lower bound (floor) (e.g. 5% or 5EUR per liter, 




or sugar content) (MAcMap Glossary). The Uruguay Round of 1994 recognized the need to standardize tariff
measurements in order to be able to compare the magnitude of different tariff types deployed (Gibson 2006: 5). As a 
consequence, non-ad valorem tariffs were converted to ad-valorem tariffs. This process is commonly refe red to as 
“tariffication” (MAcMap Glossary). 
Table 2: Overview of Tariffs 
Tariff Description Example 
Ad-valorem Tariff Tariff reflects percentage of monetary value of 
imports 
10% 
Specific Tariffs Tariff is related to measures such as volume, weight, 
surface (as opposed to the monetary value of imports) 
5% per 5 liter 
Compound Tariffs Tariff comprising ad-valorem duty in addition to 
specific duty which is subtracted or added 
5% plus 5EUR per liter 
Mixed Tariffs Tariff is based on conditional choice between an ad-
valorem duty and a specific duty, subject to upper 
(ceiling) and/ or lower (floor) bound 
10% or 5EUR per liter, 
whatever is higher 
Technical Tariffs Tariff is determined by specific technical factors Alcohol content 
Source: Information compiled from MAcMap.org, Author’s Own 
Unlike a NTM, a tariff is always deployed with the sole intent to protect domestic producers (Gibson et al 2001: 3). 
Gibson et al (2001: 3) point out that tariffs always have two negatives. Firstly, they raise the price of imports, 
leaving it uncompetitive with domestically manufactured commodities. Secondly, tariffs at times deter xports all 
together, which leaves the potential exporter with exports forgone (Gibson et al 2001: iv). Tokarick (2003:14) 
confirms this observation by asserting that tariffs always have substantial effects on distorting bilateral trade.   
Prevalence of Tariffs and Non Tariff Measures  
There is scholarly consensus that with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, and the establishment of the 
WTO in 1995, the gradual liberalization of global trade takes place. Literature suggests that the deployment of  
tariffs has lessened over the last decades due to the institutionalization of multilateral trade agreements (Limao et al 
2001: 451, Henson and Loader 2001: 91, Weybrock and Xia 2000: 235, Cadot and Gourdon 2012: 4). A majority of 
scholars agree that, concurrent with the global declin  of tariffs; the issuance of NTMs increases and equally 




support within the literature suggesting that NTMs are used as substitutes for tariffs in deterring imports (Henson 
and Loader 2001: 91, Weybrock and Xia 2000: 235, Gonzales-Mellado et al 2011: 11, Roberts et al 1999: i). 
Analogous with these findings are views of the Trade Report of 2012 of the WTO, which reports that NTMs are 
almost twice as restrictive as tariffs (WTO 2012: 136), thus acting as an efficient tool to deter imports.  
While there is a consensus that the establishment of the WTO caused a reduction of applied tariff, scholars single 
out the agricultural sector as one of the most resistant sectors to wide-ranging and all-encompassing tariff reductions 
(Gonazales-Mellado et al 2011: 87). Gibson et al (2001: iii) executes a survey of global tariffs and finds that tariffs 
are on average 62% higher in the agricultural sector than in the manufacturing sector. Hereby, ad-valorem tariffs add 
an average of 58% to the price of a commodity, whereas non-ad-valorem tariffs raise the price of a comm dity by 
123%. Love et al (2009: 57) corroborate this account by stating that “tariffs on agricultural products are on average 
higher than those on industrial products.” However, there are considerable fluctuations in the applications of tariffs 
in general and in agriculture in particular, depending on the country (Love et al 2009: 57). Although numerous 
accounts attest to the exceptional perseverance of tariffs in the agricultural sector, a study by Henso  and Loader 
(2001: 87) finds that with the implementation of the “Agreement on Agriculture” (AoA), the curbing of tariffs in the 
agricultural sector takes place across product groups. According to Henson and Loader (2001: 87) the av rage 
reduction in tariffs on agricultural products by developed countries ranges from 26% in the case of dairy products to 
48% for cut flowers, plants and vegetable materials, leading to an average overall tariff reduction of 37%.  
The concept of the international food regime proposes that power and control over production of the agricultural 
sector takes place on a global scale and lies at the state level. National governments with the aim of protecting 
domestic industries issue tariffs and NTMs (Friedmann 1982: 83). There are explicit (e.g. SPS and TBT agreements) 
and implicit (e.g. prohibitively high tariffs) rules that govern trade in agriculture. The WTO essentially acts as the 
nominal body to govern the global dimension of trade in agriculture and sanctions the legal use of tarif s and NTMs.  
Although research indicates the progressive decline of tariffs in world trade, a stable pattern of production and 
power emerged and only encourages the slow dismantling of protectionist policy tools.  
Friedmann (1982: 83) attests that highly industrialized nations skew the global governance of trade in agriculture in 
their favor, specifically the US and the EU, to engrain historical trade advantages in the agricultura sector gained 




have brought to the WTO. A study by Moenius (2004: 2) finds that SPS and TBT regulations have a strong negative 
effect on the agricultural sector, hampering trade. However, this effect cannot be found in the manufact ring sector, 
where standards have a positive effect (Moenius 2004: 2).  It is difficult to distinguish between legitimate 
regulations and ones that are put in place with the primary purpose of deterring imports from third parties. The 
Group of 33 (G33)5 requesting WTO members to show restraint in the application of TBT and SPS standards to 
products originating from the G33 epitomize this ambiguity (Disdier et al 2008: 336). The average export structure 
of developing countries makes them particularly vulnerable to protectionist regulations in the agricultural sector. 
Henson and Loader (2001: 86) find that from 1980-1997, agricultural and food products composed roughly 25% of 
total merchandise exports from sub-Sahara Africa. This notion is supported by Disdier et al’s (2008: 341) findings 
that developing countries’ exports are proportionally more affected by SPS and TBT standards, than developed 
countries’ exports, due to the fact that they largely export agricultural products.  
A substantial amount of research deals with the question which country, or group of countries, deploys the largest 
amount of regulations and standards in a protectionis  manner. In order to establish which countries are the biggest 
offenders, it is common to analyze trade disputes put forward with the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM).  
The WTO DSM permits countries to file formal complaints in regards to unfair trading practices by other countries 
(Roberts et al 1999: 11). Disputes regarding the deployment of NTMs are frequent and take place between 
developed and less developed countries, but also amng developed countries themselves. However, literature 
suggests that highly industrialized countries receive most complaints, and that the majority of complaints pertain to 
the agricultural sector. Hoekman and Nicita (2008) substantiate this finding and show that the impact of NTMs’ 
restrictiveness for agricultural trade is especially valid for developed countries.  
Moreover, in terms of SPS and TBT regulations, the EU, next to Japan and the US, receive the most complaints in 
regards to deploying NTMs. Geography Indication (GI) measures upheld by the EU constitute a large amount f 
complaints. GI measures restrict the use of certain n mes for products that are not originating in a particular area, or 
that are not processed according to a particular standard, such as champagne or cheddar. The EU contests that the 
unauthorized use of GIs harms consumers and legitimate producers, which in return need to be protected 
(Dell’Aquilla 2008: 348). This is notably applicable for regional and bilateral trade agreements that e EU 
                                                   




concludes with third parties and which include intellectual property rights clauses that firmly regulate labeling 
procedures, predominantly in the wine and spirits market (Dell’Aquilla 2007: 272).  
Review of Methodologies 
The majority of methodologies analyze the effect of ariffs and NTMs in aggregate, whereby the local tr de context 
and applicable trade concessions are ignored. I argue that this can lead to egregious policy recommendations and 
enables the construction of models that misrepresent fundamental realities on the ground. Methodologies concerning 
the study of tariffs and NTMs differ in their approaches. Most studies focusing on the study of the effects of tariffs 
use a partial or general equilibrium model6, which makes it possible to assess welfare gains and losses caused by 
tariffs. A study by Tokarick (2003) deploying a parti l and general equilibrium approach finds that tariffs on imports 
are a far greater cause for distortion of welfare eff cts than domestic subsidies. Hoekman et al’s (2003) study 
confirms this finding by stating that reducing tariffs by 50% has a larger positive effect on developing countries’ 
exports than reducing domestic subsidies by 50%. Gibson (2006), on the other hand, generates a catalogue f bound7 
and applied tariffs8 of product groups and finds that while the US and the EU have the lowest overall agricultural 
tariffs, specific product groups such as dairy and beef are subject to ‘megatariffs’, i.e. tariffs that are particularly 
high. Also, Hoekman et al (2003) find that while th EU and the US might have the least tariffs applied, the impact 
of their tariff restrictions is much more intense than that of other countries. 
 
Several studies give an overview of current methods in place to account for the role of NTMs in general. Institutions 
with policy relevance, such as the OECD, UNCTAD and the WTO are at the forefront to assess different 
methodologies. Among the first surveys on the quantifica ion of NTMs is the study of Bora et al (2002), published 
by UNCTAD. Similarly, Ferrantino (2006) published a survey of methods on the quantification of NTMs with the 
OECD. More recently, the World Trade Report of 2012 by the WTO dedicates an entire chapter to the cataloguing 
                                                   
6General equilibrium theory studies supply and demand fu damentals in an economy with multiple markets, with the objective of 
proving that all prices are at equilibrium. The theory analyzes the mechanism by which the choices of ec nomic agents are 
coordinated across all markets. General equilibrium theory is distinguished from partial equilibrium theory by the fact that 
attempts to look at several markets simultaneously rather than a single market in isolation. A partial equilibrium theory only 
looks at the clearing of a particular market.  
7Bound rates or bound tariffs represent the upper threshold to which a country is allowed to raise its tariff on an item, as 
committed under the GATT. This commitment is called tariff binding. 
8Applied tariffs or applied tariff rates are considered to be the tariff rates applied by a customs administration on imported goods. 
They are the rates published by national customs authorities for duty administration purposes. These rat s are often considerably 
lower than the bound rate established as a result of trade negotiations or than the rate listed in the national tariff schedules. They 
can also be lower than the MFN rate. Applied tariff rates also include the preferences that a country may apply to certain trading 




of measures on how to quantify the impact of NTMs and UNCTAD issued a review of methods in 2013, execut d 
by Fugazza. Aforementioned surveys identify a wide array of studies and findings on the methodology of the 
quantification of NTMs, which are largely consistent with each other.  
 
In addition, there are several studies that specifically survey methodologies concerning the quantification of NTMs 
in the agricultural sector. Most notably, Beghin and Bureau’s study (2001) lays the groundwork in accounting for 
existing methodologies. Among others, Disdier et al (2008) and Gonzales-Mellado et al (2011) draw on the survey 
conducted by Beghin and Bureau (2001) when analyzing most widespread methodologies to quantify NTMs. Most 
common methods concerning the quantification of NTMs in general, and for the agricultural sector in particular, 
largely match and are classified as the price-wedge approach, the gravity model approach, the survey-approach, and 
the inventory approach. 
The price-wedge approach provides an ad-valorem tariff equivalent (AVE)9 towards measuring trade impacts. It 
compares domestic prices, including tariff equivalents, with international prices and attributes discrepancies to 
NTMs (Beghin and Bureau 2001: 113, Fugazza 2013: 9). A number of limitations, such as the assumption that 
domestic and international commodities are perfect substitutes (Fugazza 2013: 9), render this model less suitable for 
the quantification of the effects of NTMs.  
In contrast, scholars consider the gravity-approach s one of the most appropriate methodology to measur  the 
impact of NTMs (Anderson and Wincoop 2003: 171, Disdier et al 2008: 341). The gravity model approach relates 
bilateral trade flows to GDP, distance and related data that affect trade barriers. It includes information on NTMs as 
explanatory variables and compares predicted trade flows in the absence of NTMs (Disdier et al 2008: 337). Thus, 
foregone trade caused by NTMs can be measured. Gebrehiwet (2007: 30) cites the limited amount of data one needs 
to compute it as one of the major advantages of the gravity model approach. In addition, the popularity of this 
approach has led to the elaboration of theoretical considerations, making it a robust choice (Gebrehewit 2007: 30).  
                                                   
9 “An AVE is a tariff presented as a percentage of the value of goods cleared through customs. It is the equivalent of a 
corresponding specific tariff measure based on unit quantities such as weight, number or volume. There ar  several 
methodologies for calculating AVEs. The method chosen depends on the intended application of the data. Most important to the 
process of calculating an AVE is the way the Unit Value of the product is calculated. The unit value is the value of each unit 
quantity imported of a product. It is based on the otal value of imports of that product divided by the quantity of import” 
(MAcMAp Glossary). 
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The majority of studies involve large n-samples which aggregate information at the state level. Gebrehiwet et al 
(2007) use the gravity model and find that SPS measures have a severely restraining effect on South African food 
exports. In addition, Otsuki et al (2001) find that 10% tighter aflatoxin10 standards will reduce imports by 11% and 
that new EU regulations, that are tighter than international standards, will lead to 63% lowers trade flows of 
groundnuts. Bellanawithana et al (2009) find that the deployment of NTMs characterizes agricultural trade between 
developed countries, whereas exports from developing to developed countries still face greater tariff obstacles.    
The survey approach, on the other hand, does not aim at quantifying the size of the impact of NTMs as much as 
understanding the relative importance of different NTMs (Beghin and Bureau 2001: 115). The survey-approach 
usually comprises structured interviews, or questionnaires, for relevant export businesses to answer (Fugazza 2013: 
10). Few studies deploy a survey approach due to the fact that conducting surveys is relatively time and resource-
intensive (Fugazza 2013: 11). However, the EU commissioned a major study utilizing a survey approach in 2011 to 
assess the importance of different NTMs (Gonzales-Mellado et al 2011). The study draws ninety-five questionnaires 
from five African countries and evaluates them in order to establish views on NTMs by exporting businesses 
(Gonzales-Mellado et al 2011: 30). General findings suggest that regulations and standards generate mixed reviews, 
generating positive views in the horticultural sector, and negative ones in the bean exporting industry (Gonzales-
Mellado et al 2011: 30).  
The most basic approach to the analysis of NTMs is the inventory-approach. The inventory approach is used in both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis. Unlike the gravity-model approach and the price-wedge-method, the inventory 
approach omits to quantify the effects of NTMs and instead catalogues the existence of them. Most often, inventory-
approaches convert the number of restrictions into frequency- and coverage-ratios (Beghin and Bureau 2001: 6). 
Ratios computed are subsequently used in further econometric analysis, such as the gravity model (Disdier et al 
2008: 335). Amongst the advantages of this approach is that it is possible to distinguish between prevalent and less-
prevalent NTMs. Being aware of the anatomy of NTMs provides an indication of the importance of the problem 
(Beghin and Bureau 2001: 113).  One of the major drawbacks of this approach is that the recording of frequencies 
and ratios cannot give insights into the severity or trade impeding effects of NTMs; however, studies deploying an 
inventory approach usually do not aim at doing so. An early study by Nogues et al (1986) illustrates that 27% of all 
10 Aflatoxins are any of a class of toxic compounds produced by certain moulds found in food, which can cause liver damage and 
cancer. 
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imports and 34% of imports from developing countries are affected by NTMs and that the usage of NTMs in general 
is on the rise. Fontagné et al (2005) also use an inventory approach and establish that around 88% of imports are 
affected by environmental NTMs, estimating that of those around 39% are deployed with protectionist intentions. 
Studies by Walkenhorst (2004) and Henson et al (2001) both find that technical barriers to trade, such as SPS 
measures, are major factors in reducing the ability of developing countries to export to developed countries. More 
specifically, Henson et al (2001) find that exporters to the EU face greatest NTMs in the agricultural food sector. 
The Context of the Legal Trade Framework 
The Common Agricultural Policy  
The six founding members of the European Union (Germany, Italy, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Belgium) 
ratified  the Treaty of Rome (1957), which led to the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
and created a common market. The creation of a common market envisioned deeper integration of constituent 
economic policies between the member states. Prior to the creation of the common market, national governments in 
isolation administered agricultural trade policies. The subsequent creation of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) in 1962 sought to counter inefficiencies created by conflicting national policies within agricultural sectors by 
deferring responsibilities to the European Commission, and away from national governments (EC(b) 2012: 4). Since 
then, the CAP constitutes one of the most pivotal cornerstones of EU policies, receiving around 73% of the EU 
budget at the time of its inception, which was reduced to 43% in 2012 (EC CAP History). 
In the past various Common Market Organizations (CMO) administered technicalities of the CAP (DG Agriculture, 
Trade in Agriculture), with a designated CMO, e.g. CMO Sugar, managing the corresponding agricultural sector. 
CMOs overseeing the management of agricultural product groups cover around 90% of agricultural products, while 
market forces regulate the remaining 10% (DG Agriculture (b), Common Agricultural Markets). To guarantee 
farmers’ income, an array of protectionist measures is available. Among others, market intervention in the form of 
buy-backs of surplus produce, direct payments to farmers, limiting production, custom duties and tariff quotas, are 
all commonly deployed methods. The degree of protectionist measures each CMO deploys is dependent on product 
type (DG Agriculture(b), Common Agricultural Markets). Thus, not all product groups are regulated to the same 




The primary purpose of the creation of the CAP was to guarantee a certain level of income to farmers, to maintain 
stable prices and to contribute to rural development within the European Community (DG Agriculture(c), CAP 
History).  Uncoordinated national support policies prior to the creation of the CAP had led to the overproduction of 
many agricultural goods, such as grain and milk, which is why the CAP introduced the allocation of production 
quotas across the European Community. In order to guarantee a minimum wage to farmers, the CAP set intrnal 
reference prices, which were historically above the world price (EC(a) 2012: 6).  With internal referenc  prices set, 
the European Community obliged itself to purchase any surplus stock of domestic farmers and to stock it, which led 
to the creation of the famous “mountains of butter” and “lakes of milk.” In addition, farmers received payments in 
form of “income support”, which were tied to production quota and land distribution. The tight regulations of the 
EU-internal agricultural market had direct consequences to its external trade in agriculture, because int rnal 
production quotas determined how many imports from third parties are required. Imports of particularly sensitive 
goods, e.g. such as sugar or dairy products, are subj ct to quota allocations and high tariffs, in order to prohibit entry 
of competitive commodities that otherwise would disrupt the planned internal agricultural sector.  
According to Friedmann (1982: 31), the EU designed an agricultural regime similar to that of the US, due to 
historical circumstance following the Second World War. Immediate food shortages after the end of the Second 
World War led to a system of subsidized agricultura production in the US. Heavily subsidized agricultural 
industries within the US caused the production of surplus stock, which was initially absorbed by the European 
Community and encouraged with the Marshall Plan (Friedmann 1982: 37).  Around 40% of Marshall Aid was used 
to purchase surplus stock from the US, mainly fertilizer and feedstock (Friedmann 1982: 37). However, this changed 
in 1954 when the US started to offload the majority of surplus stock to developing countries in the form of food aid 
(Friedmann 1982: 37). The US tacitly sanctioned the creation of a heavily subsidized agricultural industry within the 
European Community, because the European Community agreed to privileged market access of US soy and maize, 
the two agricultural sectors that overtook the importance of exports of livestock and feedstuffs (Friedmann 1982: 
38). As such, regulation of the food regime reflected a shifting balance of power towards US hegemony (Friedmann 
1982: 31). 
A stable pattern of production and power emerged (Friedmann 1982: 31) and manifests with the administration of 




Reforms to the CAP focus on the liberalization of EU agricultural markets and an on the introduction of 
sustainability measures in the farming industry (ODI 2012: 2). Among landmark reforms is the MacSharry reform of 
1992, which initiated a shift from product support (through prices, i.e. via guaranteeing the buy-back of stock to an 
intervention price much higher than the world price) to producer support (through income support, i.e. via the direct 
payment to farmers) (Binfield et al 2005: 3). Another major modification occurred in 2003 (Fishler Reform) and 
constitutes the decoupling of income support payments to farmers, following substantial reforms in thesugar, fruit, 
vegetables and wine sectors (DG Agriculture(c), History of CAP). Reforms taking place in the 2000s also 
introduced administrative ones to simplify procedures and regulations concerning the management of the CAP itself. 
Instead of hosting multiple CMOs managing corresponding agricultural sectors, a single CMO replaced them (DG 
Agriculture(c), History of CAP).  
Friedmann (1982: 29) acknowledges that domestic reforms have gone further than anyone imagined possible during 
the talks of the Uruguay Round. However, Friedmann (1982: 29) concedes that new forms of governance of the 
international food regime are not necessarily betwen “free trade” and “regulation” but between new forms of 
implicit or explicit regulation. Richmond (2009: 4) illustrates this argument, with an example of the EU Sugar 
Regime reform. According to Richardson (2009: 4), the dismantling of the heavily protectionist Sugar Regime of the 
EU in 2006 was not necessarily a product of pressur exercised by calls to reform from the WTO. In contrast, 
Richardson (2009: 4) argues that EU sugar processors, which benefitted from the Sugar Regime historically, had a 
great influence on shaping EU reforms in their favor by reducing domestic competition. Additionally, these 
companies established institutionalized advantages, such as financial and human capital, under the pre-existing 
Sugar Regime. Accordingly, they diversified production into new value-added markets and multi-nationalized 
production and thus, are in support of the liberalization of the Sugar Regime. This example is cited as an illustration 
of Friedmann’s argument that rules are shaped implicitly through national lobbies, and not only via international 
pressures from explicit bodies, such as the WTO.  
The creation and long-lasting administration of the CAP can be understood and critically analyzed when d ploying 
the concept of the international food regime. The US and EU dominate global trade in  agriculture since the end of 
the Second World War, enabled via heavy subsidies of the local agricultural industry. National governments and 




corporations steer them implicitly. The implementation of the CAP has taken place out of concerns for fo d security, 
stability and the creation of competitive advantages.  Path dependence of initial policies causes reforms to take place 
at a very slow pace. Initial policies set out an intricate and wide-reaching system of agricultural trde regulation, 
which is difficult to dismantle as each decision has huge political, economic and social consequences. Thus, the 
reproduction of power within the global agricultural tr de regime manifests with the CAP and remains very stable.  
Overview of European Union- South African Trade Relations  
The Legal Trade Framework between the EU and South Africa   
The concept of the international food regime, which Friedmann (1982) and McMichael (2004) developed, illustrates 
that the US and the EU firmly dominated the governance of trade in agriculture in the 1970s and 80s. Ideas 
favorable to the creation of an international food regime supporting US and EU interests dictated the em rgent 
international balance of power following the end of the Second World War. The creation of bodies, such as the 
WTO, and agreements, such as the CAP, SPS and TBT in the 1990s, are direct manifestations of that power. The EU 
undertook several deep-running reforms to its agricultural sector; however, they did not prove to be exceptionally 
beneficial to South Africa thus far. The following chapter demonstrates that liberal policies, such as the signing of 
the FTA between both parties and CAP reforms taking place in the background, have not led to greater agricultural 
competition from South Africa to the EU. To the contrary, since the Financial Crisis of 2008, agricultural exports 
from South Africa to the EU have yet to reach pre-crisis levels, whereas agricultural imports from theEU to South 
Africa have grown at a faster rate than any other product group. This is illustrative of the argument that legal trade 
frameworks sanctioned by the WTO are not beneficial to all parties involved, but mainly towards states that were 
pivotal in creating them in the first place, i.e. the US and constituent states of the EU.  
Following the end of Apartheid and the first democrati  elections held in South Africa in the early 1990’s, the EU 
was keen to establish a formal trade relationship with South Africa (Gonzales-Mellado et al 2001: 46). At that time, 
the EU managed the majority of economic relations with Africa via the “Lomé Convention.” The Lomé Convention 
is a trade and aid agreement between the EU and its former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). 
Signatories to the Lomé Convention benefit from a wide range of trade preferences, such as duty-free acc ss to the 
EU market and direct development aid, which is why South Africa wanted also sign the Lomé Convention (Bilal and 
Laporte 2004: 3). The EU, on the other hand, did not classify South Africa as a de-facto developing state and refused 




the Trade, Development, and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU, which would grant South Africa 
additional development aid (SAIIAS 1997: 1).  The con lusion of the TDCA in 1999, capped four years of 
negotiations, and constituted the most ambitious FTA the EU dato had ever agreed to. 
Evidently, EU preferences to enter into an FTA with South Africa, rather than allowing it to trade under the Lomé 
Convention, are a concrete example of how both parties envisioned a different development approach for S uth 
Africa and how the EU was more powerful than South Africa in realizing its views. According to WTO guidelines, a 
FTA has to be based on the guarantee of mutual market ccess with 90% of products being duty-free (SAIIAS 1997: 
2). When the FTA was signed, 83% of products originating in South Africa could enter the EU market duty-free, 
whereas around 64% of EU-products could enter the South African market duty-free. Thus, the EU had to scrap 
additional duties of 7% of commodities, whereas South Africa had to abolish duties on 26% of products (SAIIAS 
1997: 3). Both parties agreed to open up markets according to different time frames, with the EU allowing 95% of 
products from South Africa to enter its market duty-free within ten years. South Africa agreed to allow 86% of EU 
exports duty-free entrance to South Africa within twelve years (Lee 2010: 88). In 2012, South Africa exports 92% of 
products duty-free to the EU, whereas the EU exports 86% of products groups without facing tariffs (EU Memo 
2012). The EU was successful in securing the gradual granting of market access to South Africa over a period of 
twelve years. Access to EU markets was already largely available to South Africa, as the EU only had to open up an 
additional 7% of its markets. 
While WTO regulations call for the liberalization of “substantial trade”, the EU was also keen to protect sensitive 
domestic industries from potential competition by South African products. In order to protect the most important 
domestic industries, the EU placed certain product groups on a “reserve-list” and excluded them from liberalization 
all together (Fenyes et al 2008: 139). The EU barred bananas, sugar, beef, rice, maize, starches and my fruits and 
vegetables, whereas South Africa excluded fresh meats, d iry products, some cereals and sugar products from 
liberalization (Fenyes et al 2008: 138). Thus, the WTO sanctions rules favoring EU interests, because it allows to 
legally protect industries via its reserve list, but it forces South Africa to open up substantially, including sensitive 
industries. 
Next to the overall FTA, the EU and South Africa deci d to exclude two contentious sectors from being included in 




no agreement could be reached during the already long-running talks (Lee 2010: 89). Instead, both parties agreed to 
defer talks on both sectors by signing separate agrements on fisheries and wine and spirits at a later point (Lee 
2010: 89), and subsequently signed an “Agreement on Trade in Wine” and an “Agreement on Trade in Spirits” n 
2002. Both agreements establish that South Africa will phase out the usage of certain names, e.g. sherry and port, 
over the next five years across all exports (Agreemnt on Trade in Wine 2002, Agreement on Trade in Spirits 2002), 
because the EU is one of the strongest advocates for the implementation of “Geographic Indications” (GI). The 
GATT (1947) introduced the GI- issue with the establishment of the Uruguay Round (1994) (Kerr 2006: 3). Similar 
to rules concerning FTAs, rules that the WTO established following the Uruguay Round work privilege EU interest, 
as the protection of its domestic industry becomes legally binding on an international level and with legal 
enforcement from the WTO.  
In contrast to the agreements on wine and spirits, the EU and South Africa failed to sign a proposed fishery 
agreement as the topic became increasingly contentious during negotiations. The EU, especially Spain and France, 
demanded access to South African waters, which was un cceptable to South Africa, who prefers to operate its own 
vessels in its waters (Bilal and Laporte 2004: 21). This leaves the fishery sector as the only one not liberalized in a 
fashion that is palatable to the EU. Apart from this, the EU constructed a bilateral legal framework between itself 
and South Africa that cemented its position of superiority vis-à-vis South African trade by deploying mechanisms, 
such as an FTA and GI, enabled by the WTO.  
Ex – and Import Trends  
The production of stable patterns of power and prope ty in the trade in agriculture are key ideas to the international 
food regime. I analyze direct expressions of power and property in trade relationships between the EU and South 
Africa by looking at ex- and imports of both parties.  EU- South African trade relations largely flourished since the 
political and economic liberalization of South Africa in 1994. The EU is South Africa’s most important export 
market, when excluding exports to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). In addition, the EU is alo South 
Africa’s greatest source of imports (EU Memo 2012). South Africa is the EU’s largest trade partner in Africa and 
17th largest trade partner when excluding EU-intra trade, accounting for 17.6% of overall exports in 2012 (EU 
Memo 2012). A direct comparison of trade between South Africa and the EU reveals that since the signin of the 
FTA in 2000, exports of both partners are growing, but experienced a sharp decline with the Financial Crisis of 
 
 
2008, while recovering from it the following years
faster rate than vice versa, a trend that has been magnified following the Financial Crisis of 2008. 
Figure 2: Comparison of Trade between EU
Source: UNCTAD 
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balance in agricultural trade for the first time in 2011, increasing agricultural exports to all its destinations (EC
2012: 2). Particularly, this growth is spearheaded by expor
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Table 4: EU Exports T o South Africa (1995
 Source: UNCTAD, Author’s Visualization  
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The Role of Tariffs and Non-Tariff Measures in Agricultural Trade 
 Tariffs vs. Non-Tariff Measures  
The literature review outlines that tariffs and non-tariff measures (NTMs) are the most important protectionist tools 
available to the state. Findings of the literature review state that the deployment of tariffs is gradu lly substituted by 
the deployment of NTMs. Having established that the bilateral legal trade framework between the EU andSouth 
Africa privileges EU interests over South Africa’s, the next section analyses whether NTMs and tariffs are used in a 
discriminatory fashion to protect EU domestic industrie . It fits into the wider scope of the study, b analyzing how 
far the international food regime is shaped by the deployment of the most important protectionist tools available to 
the state.  
Research Design  
The quantitative part of my study probes whether NTMs and tariffs are used in a strategic fashion to pr tect 
sensitive domestic industries of the EU agricultura m rket. It does so by analyzing agricultural exports from South 
Africa to the EU. The population of the study consist  of agricultural exports from South Africa to the EU. 
Agricultural products are classified according to the definition set out by the WTO in its “Agreement on 
Agriculture” (AoA), as well as including fishery products. Cases are analyzed in a cross-sectional fashion, with each 
case being represented by a tariff line at the HS-six digit level of the Harmonized System of Classifications of 
Trade11, the most commonly disaggregated level, in order to generate differentiated observations about industry 
groups.  
 
Prior to analyzing data on tariffs and NTMs, South African agricultural exports, I classify three distinct categories, 
i.e. levels of sensitivity: highly sensitive products, sensitive products and non-sensitive products.  I categorize 
                                                   
11 “The Harmonized System is an international nomenclature for the classification of products. It allows participating countries to 
classify traded goods on a common basis for customs purposes. At the international level, the Harmonized System for classifying 
goods is a six-digit code system. The HS comprises approximately 5000 article/product descriptions that appear as headings and 
subheadings, arranged in 97 chapters, grouped in 21sections. The six digits can be broken down into three parts. The first two 
digits (HS-2) identify the chapter the goods are classified in, e.g. 09 = Coffee, Tea, Maté and Spices. The next two digits (HS-4) 
identify groupings within that chapter, e.g. 09.02 = Tea, whether or not flavoured. The next two digits (HS-6) are even more 
specific, e.g. 09.02.10 Green tea (not fermented) in immediate packings of a content not exceeding 3 k. Up to the HS-6 digit 
level, different countries classification codes areid ntical. Beyond this, countries are free to introduce national distinctions for 
tariffs by adding more digits to make the HS classification of products even more specific. This greater level of specificity is 
referred as the national tariff line level. For example the United States of America adds another fourdigits to its exports and 
imports to classify them in greater depth. The Harmonised System was formally known as the Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System. It was developed by the World Customs Organization and has been adopted by most trading 
nations” (MAcMap.org Glossary). 
30 
products grouped under the safeguard clause in the FTA between South Africa and the EU as ‘highly sensitive.’ 
Products subject to safeguard clauses are allowed to have higher tariffs than the average tariff agreed upon with the 
AoA, because they are of an especially sensitive nature to the importing country (Rudloff and Simons 2004: 1). In 
addition, I categorize product groups covered by virtue of geographic indication (GI), such as wine and cheese, 
regulated with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), as moderately 
sensitive products. I classify them as highly sensitive products, because they fail to be sensitive enough to be 
covered by a safeguard clause.  Remaining product groups I classify as non-sensitive, unless literature suggests 
otherwise for specific product groups.  
I deploy an inventory- approach to catalogue the existence of tariffs and NTMs. Furthermore, I acknowledge that the 
mere presence or absence of NTMs or tariffs does not provide information on the magnitude or trade diverting effect 
it may have. However, the focus of this study does not lie with the quantification of the impact of tariffs and NTMs, 
but instead with the testing of the relationship between the existence of tariffs and NTMs and the degree of 
sensitivity of a product group.  
The variable “degree of sensitivity” acts as independent variable with three different categories (highly sensitive, 
sensitive, and non-sensitive). Tariffs and NTMs act as dependent variables. Due to the fact that there are two 
dependent variables, I execute two separate models. The first model tests whether there are statistically significant 
differences between groups (highly sensitive, sensitive, and non-sensitive) when controlling for the deployment of 
tariffs.  I measure tariffs in terms of applied tariffs in the year 2011, expressed in ad-valorem equivalent tariffs12 
(AVE) in form of percentage of import value in USD. As findings of the literature review suggest, different types of 
tariffs can be converted to be expressed as AVE tariffs (AVE), which makes the comparison between different 
tariffs straight-forward. The second model tests whether there are statistically significant differences between groups 
(highly sensitive, sensitive, and non-sensitive) when controlling for the deployment of NTMs.  Each NTM 
constitutes a compulsory guideline or form when exporting to the EU.  
12 In Market Access Map, all non ad valorem (NAV) applied tariffs are converted to ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) according to the 
unit value (UV) based method. This means that AVEs are calculated by dividing a given NAV tariff per unit by the value of the 




The null-hypothesis of the first model states that there are no differences in the application of tariffs when 
controlling for degree of sensitivity. Thus, I expect to find that on average the same amount of tariffs are applied to 
highly sensitive goods as to non-sensitive goods. The alternative hypothesis states that there are statistic lly 
significant differences between the applications of tariffs when controlling for degree of sensitivity, with all three 
groups being different from each other. It states that highly sensitive products are subject to greate tariffs than 
sensitive and non-sensitive ones. The null hypothesis of the second model states that there are no differences in the 
application of NTMs when controlling for degree of sensitivity. Thus, I expect to find that on average th  same 
amount of NTMs are applied to highly sensitive goods as to non-sensitive goods. The alternative hypothesis states 
that there are differences in the application of NTMs when controlling for degree of sensitivity, with all three groups 
being different from each other.  
 
The statistical database of the United Nations Commdity Trade Statistics database (UN COMTRADE) provides 
data on exports from South Africa to the EU. Here, data is listed according to the Harmonized System Classification 
on Trade. The HS classification of commodities is widely used when comparing trade data between different 
countries and has undergone major revisions (1992, 2007 and 2012) since its establishment in 1988.  Reasons for 
revisions vary, e.g. the desire to reflect new product groups or to account for specific products in greater detail 
(MAcMaporg Glossary). The UN maintains different daabases, which diverge on trade classification deployed.  
Comprehensive data on tariffs and NTMs are found at the TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information System) 
database, which UNCTAD administers in conjunction with the International Trade Centre (ITC). TRAINS is a 
comprehensive database at the most disaggregated lev l of the Harmonized System (HS), covering tariff and non-
tariff measures as well as import flows by origin for more than 150 countries.  The TRAINS database lists tariffs 
according to the HS.2012 nomenclature, whereas the same database hosts information on NTMs according to the 
HS.2007 nomenclature. The database on exports, managed by UN COMTRADE, also hosts information according 
to the HS.2007 nomenclature, which is why I convert applicant products from HS.2012 to HS.2007. In order to 
translate tariffs and product lines from the HS.2012 to the HS.2007 one, I use the conversion tool at MAcMap.org 
(hosted by UNCTAD) and align HS.2012 product groups with HS.2007 ones. In the case that the HS.2012 
nomenclature hosts multiple product groups where the HS.2007 hosts only one, I compute the average of all relevant 




data is consistent with each other and reflect the same product groups, minimizing the risk of mismatched 
information and subsequent errors.  
.   
The TRAINS database records data concerning NTMs at the national tariff line level (NTL), 13 which extends the 
most detailed international level of the classification of product groups (HS-six). The HS-six level displays a 
maximum of six-digit codes, but states are able to record more detailed levels of product groups, e.g. at the HS-ten 
level. Therefore, I convert the HS-ten- level to reflect equivalents within the HS-six level. To do so, I group relevant 
NTLs with identical HS-six headings into HS-six product groups.  Once I convert all NTL product groups to reflect 
HS-six product groups, I check for duplicates to make sure that none of the NTMs within one HS-six product group 
is entered more often than once, as this would lead to an upward bias in regards to the amount of NTMs present via 
duplication. Apart from removing duplicate entries of NTMs, NTMs in place on the HS-six level remain unweighted 
in relation to affected NTLs. Weighting adjusts theamount of NTMs to account for the number of relevant NTMs in 
place. I decide against the weighting of NTMs because this would lead to a downward bias when recording NTMs in 
place, caused by adjusting for NTLs. Some HS-six product groups display three NTLs, whereas others display as 
many as 200 NTLs. I argue that the amount of NTLs accorded to specific HS-six groups gives an implicit indication 
of how sensitive the entry of a good is to the EU. Thus, highly sensitive product groups will exhibit greater amounts 
of NTLs than product groups that are less sensitive.  To adjust for the amount of NTLs in place would mean that a 
HS-six product group with 200 NTLs and 200 different NTMs in place would reflect the same amount of a HS-six 
product group with one NTL in place and one NTM accorded to it. In order to retain the absolute amount of NTMs 
in place for a specific HS-six group, I only adjust for duplicates and keep the number of NTMs without weighing.  
Categorization of Degree of Sensitivity 
Prior to the ratification of the AoA, central GATT obligations to limit tariffs exempted the agricultural sector 
(Burrell et al 2011: 3). However, with the ratification of the AoA in 1995, the successor organization o the GATT, 
the WTO, recognized that the agricultural sector should no longer be regarded as a special case meriting protection 
from liberalizing trade policies. The AoA, for the first time, set out concrete steps to liberalize the global agricultural 
                                                   
13 National Tariff Line codes refer to the classificaton codes, applied to merchandise goods by individual countries, that are longer 
than the HS six digit level. Countries are free to introduce national distinctions for tariffs and many other purposes. The national 
tariff line codes are based on the HS system but are longer than six digits. For example, the six digit HS code 010120 refers to Asses, 
mules and hinnies, live, where as the US National Tariff line code 010120.10 refers to live purebred breeding asses, 010120.20 refers 




industry. The regulation of export subsidies, which highly industrialized states largely issue to domestic farmers; 
market access; quota restriction and direct payments to farmers, are pertinent issue areas (IATRC Working Group: 
2). The AoA defines agricultural products in terms of the HS system of product classification with its Annex I 
(Product Coverage). Annex I delineates which product groups are covered under the AoA and thus classified as 
agricultural products. Because the AoA is the most authoritative source on the classification of agricultural products 
and widely adopted, this paper deploys the same definition. The classification of agricultural commodities covers 
basic agricultural products such as wheat, raw animl skins, cotton and live animals. In addition, it covers products 
that are derived from them such as bread, butter and meat. Moreover, the AoA stipulates that processed agricultural 
goods, such as chocolate and sausages, are also defined as agricultural products.  
 
However, two product groups- fish products and forestry products- that I expected to find covered under th  AoA 
are not listed. While the AoA does not cover fish products, this study includes fish and fish products in its scope, 
because the fishery industry exhibits similar features to the agricultural industry.  The fishery industry, as a part of 
the agricultural industry more widely, represents a major industry contributing to food security and employs a large 
number of people, ranging from an industrial to artis nal scale. Similar to the agricultural industry, the fishery 
industry contributes significantly to rural development, pre-empting rural flights to urban areas due to a lack of 
opportunities.  In addition, regulations and standards, such as SPS and TBT measures, in place guiding the health 
and safety-compliant handling of agricultural products are also covering the fishery industry. Not only is the fishery 
industry subject to the same health and safety regulations as the agricultural sector, but it is also subject to the same 
agreements concerning safety guard clauses (Agreement on Safeguard Clauses) and intellectual property rights 
(TRIPS) (FAO Fishery). Due to this, the fishery sector is included in this analysis.  
Table 6: Commodities Covered in this Study According to the HS Classification System 
HS Code  HS Chapter Title 
01-  05 Animal and Animal Products  
06.-15 Vegetable Production 






33.01 Essential Oils 
35.01- 35.05 Albuminoidal substances, modified starches, glues)  
3809.1 Finishing Agents  
3823.69 Sorbitol n.e.p. 
41.01- 41.03 Hides and Skins  
43.01 Raw Furskins 
50.01- 50.03 Raw Silk and Silk Waste 
51.01- 51-03 Wool and Animal Hair  
52.01- 52.5103 Raw Cotton, Waste and Cotton Carded or Combed 
53.01 Raw Flax  
53.02 Raw Hemp  
Source: Agreement on Agriculture (1995, WTO) 
Degree of Sensitivity  
Prior to testing the relationship between degree of sensitivity with tariffs and NTMs, I qualify which products 
belong to which group (highly sensitive, sensitive, and non-sensitive). To do so, I review common trade mechanism 
deployed to protect sensitive industry and by identifyi g which products are subject to it. I start bydetermining 
which products belong to the highly sensitive group. In order for a product to classify as a “highly sen itive”, it must 
be either subject to a safeguard clause, subject to internal reference prices, a quota allocation system or currently 
negotiated at the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). Products belonging to sensitive goods are either 
subject to stringent marketing or trademark rules. Lastly, I classify remaining products groups as non-se sitive by 
default.   
 
Identifying Highly Sensitive Product Groups  
Commodities of which production is entirely regulated according to a system of internal quota allocatin, I classify 
as ‘highly sensitive’ goods. These commodities belong to the category ‘highly sensitive’, because they are not 
subject to any liberal market forces, such as supply and demand, determining price, but instead are subsidized to 
ensure a minimum price and allocated quotas to reflect a maximum supply, as stipulated by the CAP and executed 
with the CMO. In order to guarantee the effectiveness of designated quotas, imports by third parties ar  also subject 
to quota allocations. Quota allocations ensure that only a pre-mediated amount of imports enters the EU market, thus 




“price triggers” take effect.  Price triggers cause prohibitively high tariffs and render any imports exceeding quotas 
uncompetitive with the aim of deterring them altogether. The sugar, fishery, rice, cereal, rice and grain sectors are all 
subject to a quota allocation system. 
 
In addition, these sectors are not only subject to qu ta allocation systems, but the establishment of intervention 
prices. Intervention prices are higher than the world p ice and set by the CMO. The EU issues direct or indirect 
payments, covering the discrepancy between world prices and intervention price. While the EU adjusted i s CAP 
reform over the last decades to accommodate such concerns, e.g. lowering intervention prices to be closer to the 
actual world price, it nevertheless continues to issue intervention prices within certain sectors. Due to the fact that 
the sugar, cereal, rice and grain sectors are all he vily regulated, I confirm the classification as ‘highly sensitive’ 
commodities. Moreover, milk and milk products qualify for a range of stringent support measures according to the 
CMO (DG Agriculture(f), Agricultural Products). For that matter, I classify all aforementioned product groups as 
‘highly sensitive’ goods.    
Moreover, I categorize product groups reported to the WTO DSM (Dispute Settlement Mechanism) due to 
protectionist measures  with the EU as the defender as ‘highly sensitive’ product groups.  The DSM provides a 
forum to alert the international community to unfair trade practices by fellow states. Unfair trade practices refer to 
the issuing of protectionist measures by an offending state, which limits market access of commodities from third 
parties (SIDA 2004: 3). The majority of cases brought in front of the DSM are resolved within the inital stage, 
called the consultation stage, and never progress to secondary stages, such as initiating panel proceedings which 
mark the beginning of the formal litigation stage (SIDA 2004: 4). While consultations are supposed to be resolved 
within 60 days via mutually satisfactory solutions, a minority of cases remains within the consultation stage for 
years or even decades. Aforementioned product groups have in common that they are not, or at maximum only
moderately, exposed to liberal market forces(SIDA 2004: 4). 
To date, the WTO records 469 disputes.14 Of these, 23 disputes remain unresolved (WTO Current Status of DSM). 
In 2007, the EU involved 41 ongoing WTO disputes, of which it was the respondent (i.e. defendant) in 19 cases and 
the complainant in 22 cases (DG Trade 2007: 1). For the purpose of this study, I only classify product groups 
                                                   




concerning open disputes as ‘highly sensitive’ and omit past disputes. Having undergone an exhaustive audit of all 
currently ongoing 23 disputes involving the EU as a respondent, I identify 12 cases that are related to agriculture, as 
stipulated with the AoA.  
Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and the US brought forward cases relevant to the agricultural sector, 
concerning rice, grain, coffee, processed cheese and wine. In addition to third parties, Denmark and Norway of the 
European Union also filed a complaint against the EU in regards to unfair treatment of fishery products (farmed 
salmon, herring and mackerel). Reasons for complaints range from disputing SPS and TBT measures as well as 
opposing countervailing measures and the allocation of tariff quota rates (TQR).  The rice and grain sector are 
already classified as ‘highly sensitive’ commodities due to the fact that they are heavily regulated by the CMO. In 
addition, I classify following commodities as ‘highly sensitive’: processed cheese, wine, coffee, fishand garlic.  
 
 
Table 7: Overview of Current Complaints at WTO Against the EU in Agriculture 
Product  Complaint Referred By  
Grain, Rice  High Tariffs, SPS, TBT, Import Licensing  Uruguay, India 
Processed Cheese Subsidies, Countervailing Measures US  
Wine TBT Argentina 
Coffee Preferential Treatment to Third Parties Brazil (2x) 
Fish Safeguard Measures Denmark, Norway 
Garlic  TQR to China Argentina  
Source: Author’s Survey of WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism  
Another source of identifying ‘highly sensitive’ product groups is the FTA signed between the EU and South Africa. 
In order to attain the goal of full market access, both parties agreed to gradually lower Most Favored Nation tariffs,15 
                                                   
15 “MFN tariffs are the tariffs applied by WTO members to goods from other WTO members. In the case of WTO non members, 




at a rate specified with Annex I of the FTA (TDCA 1999: Annex I). List 5 of Annex IV explicitly deals with 
provisions relating to trade liberalization for agricultural products (TDCA 1999: Annex IV). However, the FTA 
concluded by both parties failed to generate an agreement in regards to the treatment of trade in fishery products.  
Annex V sets out technical details in regards to the liberalization of the trade in fishery products, a  fishery products 
are not usually classified as agricultural products. While the agricultural products covered with Annex IV are not 
subject to the ratification of an additional agreemnt, product groups specified with Annex V are due to be revised 
once an official fishery agreement has been signed. Thus, both parties agreed to negotiate an individual agreement at 
a later point in time, which, as of now, has not been concluded. Due to its contested nature during the FTA 
negotiations and the failure to produce an agreement ten years later, I have sufficient evidence as to reasonably 
classify fishery products as a ‘highly sensitive’ product group. South Africa and the EU negotiated bilateral trade in 
wine and spirits separately from the more comprehensiv  FTA. Large annexes accompany the agreements on wine 
and spirits, which identify product groups subject to GI by the EU. Because wine and spirit products are subject to 
extensive scrutiny when it comes to trade-marking, I classify respective product groups as ‘highly sensitive.’ 
In addition, I specify ‘highly sensitive’ commodities based on products that are currently covered under the 
Safeguard Agreement (SG Agreement) issued in 1994 with the Uruguay Round (WTO Safeguard Clauses). The SG 
Agreement allows countries, for a maximum of four years, to apply so-called ‘emergency safety measures’ in 
exceptional circumstances to protect domestic industries under threat (WTO Safeguard Clauses).  A safety m asure 
can commonly be applied when an import ‘surge’ (absolute increase) takes place, or when imports are subject to a 
dwindling market, even though the actual import quantity remains static (relative increase) (WTO Safeguard 
Clauses).  Countries wishing to deploy a safety clause need to notify the WTO of their intentions, which records the 
initiation of relevant safeguard measures. Thus, it i  possible to trace any current safety clauses in place by the EU. 
Consulting the WTO databank, I establish that the EU has currently no safeguard measures reported to the WTO 
(Sim 2012: 5). Three had been issued in 2002, 2003, and 2004 respectively, but all have expired. Furthermore, it has 
notified the WTO of a safeguard pertaining to strawberries in 2005 and to wireless modems in 2010, which were 
                                                                                                                                                           
and Trade (GATT) lays down the principle of Most Favoured Nation treatment (MFN). The MFN clause state that a member of 
the GATT must treat all GATT members equally. The WTO is the successor of the GATT and the WTO’s rules d rive from the 
outcome of the 1986-94 Uruguay Round negotiations which included a major revision of the original General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). So the application of theMFN principle is required of WTO members. Every time a WTO member 
improves the benefits that it gives to one trading partner, it has to give the same "best" treatment to all other WTO members, so 
that they remain equal. Countries are to grant equal tre tment - not more favorable or discriminatory - to goods and services from 
all WTO members. The MFN principle applies to all triffs - whether or not they have been subject to negotiations between 




both terminated before the four-year expiration period (Sim 2012: 5). Hence, the analysis of safeguarded clauses 
fails to generate any additional ‘highly’ sensitive products.  
Analysis of the different criteria reveals that often the same products are cited within different contexts. For 
example, fishery and wine products are cited within the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and were so 
controversially debated and subsequently excluded from the comprehensive FTA altogether. Similarly, sugar and 
sugar products are subject to stringent quota allocati n and interference prices, as well as disputed at the WTO. 
Triangulation of this kind merits the assumption that proxies used to identify “highly sensitive” products, are 
appropriately chosen.  
Table 8: Overview of Highly Sensitive Goods 
Name of Product Group Reason for Classification 
Sugar, Rice, Grain, Cereals   System of quota allocation, interventionist measure allowed (e.g. 
buy-outs and export subsidies), Subject to multilateral trade 
disputes at WTO 
Fishery products, wine and spirits, processed 
cheese 
No agreement reached with FTA, Fishery products are subject to 
strict quota system, Subject to multilateral trade disputes at WTO  
Milk and Milk Products Fixed intervention price, subsidies for produce storage  
Beef and Veal Granting of private storage aid, Customs tariffs for importers, 
direct payments to farmers  
 
Identifying Sensitive Goods  
Sensitive goods, I classify as product groups that are not covered by any formal safeguard clauses or tringent 
domestic regulation, but that exhibit a proven recod f being sensitive to the EU by different means. I  order to 
determine which product groups are historically sensitive to the EU internal market, I analyze provisions set out by 
the CAP. As previously stated, not all agricultural products groups covered by the CAP are subject to the same 
degree of protectionist measures. For example, some product groups are entirely regulated by the policies set out 
within the CMO, while others are only subject to stringent marketing measures. Because I classify product groups 
that CMO regulates heavily regulated as ‘highly sensitive’ goods, I classify product groups that are subject to a 
lesser degree of protectionism, issued under the CAP, as ‘sensitive’ commodities. As mentioned above, for a product 




following criteria: the setting of intervention prices, sanctioning the buying of surplus stock, be abl to issue export 
subsidies and set production quotas within that particular agricultural sector.  
 
In contrast, product groups that I classify as ‘sensitive’ are neither subject to internal and external quota regulations 
nor does an intervention price regulate them. Criteria pertaining to the classification of ‘sensitive’ commodities are 
less market-invasive than the identification of ‘hig ly sensitive’ commodities. Thus, I identify ‘sensitive’ product 
groups by looking at the application of ‘soft’ measures, such as regulations and standards, which are applicable to 
specific product groups. Soft measures take various f rms and I define marketing standards, crisis management 
measures or environmental standards as soft measures. All remaining agricultural product groups, neithr classified 
as ‘highly sensitive’ nor ‘sensitive,’ I categorize as ‘non-sensitive’ product groups by default.  
Fruit and vegetables are among the product groups sbject to strict marketing regulations, but a system of quota 
allocation does not regulate them. While there are general marketing standards setting out guidelines on how to 
promote fruit and vegetables accurately, there are ten product groups that are subject to specific marketing standards 
(SMS) (EC (a) Fruit and Vegetables). EU Regulation 1221/2008 reduced fruit and vegetables subject to specific 
marketing standards, rather than general ones, from 36 to ten. Specific marketing standards are stricter than general 
market standards (GMS) (DG Trade and Agriculture 2009: 5). For that reason, the ten product groups covered under 
the SMS regime, I categorize as ‘sensitive’ product groups. Similar to fruits and vegetables, live plants and products 
of floriculture (i.e. flowers) are subject to ‘soft’ regulatory measures, encouraging the regulation of i ternal flower 
production as well as exports (EC(e) Flowers) and also categorize them as ‘sensitive’ commodities.  
Table 9: Overview of Sensitive Product Groups 
Name of Product Group Reason for Classification  
Apples, Citrus Fruit, Kiwifruit, Lettuce, Peaches 
and Nectarines, Pears, Strawberries, Sweet 
Peppers, Table Grapes, Tomatoes  
Specific Marketing Standards apply 
Flowers 
Improve quality, better organize production, processing 





The group ‘non-sensitive’ constitutes any commodities not subject to measures applied to the sensitive or highly 
sensitive group. It entails commodities of animal origin, such as hides and skins, and also includes vegetable 
products such as salads, table grapes and sweet potatoes.  
Table 10: Overview of Non-Sensitive Product Groups 
Name of Product Group Reason for Classification  
Hides, Skins, Sweet Potatoes, Beans, Peas, Salads, 
Brussels Sprouts, Table Grapes, Nuts, Dates, Dried 
Apricots  
Not subject to particular regulations 
  
Results and Analysis  
Results  
The population of both models is identical and consists of agricultural commodities exported from South Africa to 
the EU within the year of 2011, being aggregated at the HS-six digit level. The population and sample ar identical 
due to the fact that all agricultural exports from South Africa to the EU are known and recorded, which is why the 
possibility of sampling error is zero. The sample consists of 330 cases in total and is sub-divided into three 
categories: non-sensitive commodities, sensitive comm dities and highly sensitive commodities. All three groups 
vary in size with the non-sensitive category being largest (n=161), followed by the category highly-sensitive 
(n=106). The category sensitive (n=61) is almost roughly two and a half times smaller than the largest group, non-
sensitive.  
Model 1: Tariffs  
The entire sample exhibits a wide range of tariffs applied with r: 0%- 61.1%. Thus, the overall lowest tariff is 0% 
and the largest is 61.1% (M= 3.09%, SD=7.45%).  Different categories vary in their range of tariffs applied, with 
the category non-sensitive having the smallest range (r: 0%- 16.9%) and the category highly sensitive having the 
largest range, which is identical to the range of the entire group (r: 0%- 61.1%). The mean and standard eviation of 
each category are proportionally larger with degree of sensitivity. The category non-sensitive has the lowest mean 
and deviation (M=0.6%, SD=2.35%), the category sensitive has the second lowest mean and deviation (M=3.04%, 





Table 11: Descriptive Statistics of Tariffs 
Sensitivity N Range Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Non- Sensitive  162 16.90% 0.00% 16.90% 0.60% 2.35% 
Sensitive  61 55.00% 0.00% 55.00% 3.05% 8.33% 
Highly 
Sensitive  
106 61.10% 0.00% 61.10% 6.91% 9.81% 
 
Individual histograms16 for all three categories reveal that frequency distributions of tariffs are extremely leptokurtic 
and positively skewed across categories, with observations clustering around low values and especially 0%. The 
category non-sensitive is non-normally distributed with kurtosis of 24.54 (SE= 0.38) and skewnesss of 4.75 
(SE=0.19). The category sensitive is non-normally distributed with kurtosis of 26.32 (SE=0.60) and skewness of 
4.71 (SE=0.31). Similar levels also hold true for the category highly sensitive with kurtosis of 13.28 (SE=0.465) and 
skewness of 3.12 (SE=0.24). A Q-Q plot is run for each category in order to corroborate the account that all 
distributions are non-normal. Analysis of individual Q-Q plots17 confirms the existence of a non-normal distribution 
with observed scores deviating greatly from scores that would be expected if frequencies were distribued normally. 
Evidence of the histogram and Q-Q plot suggests that transforming scores to reflect a normal distribution would not 
be adequate as distortions are not caused by outliers. B cause the assumption of non-normality is clearly violated, I 
deploy non-parametric tests to analyze the null-hypothesis.  
The Kruskal- Wallis18 one-way analysis of variance by ranks tests whether tariffs are applied as a condition of 
degree of sensitivity. It is the most suitable non-parametric test to deploy because it is the most powerful one 
available and my data also fulfills assumptions required to run a Kruskal-Wallis test. It assumes samples to be 
independent and ordered categorical independent variables, as is the case with my data. My independent variable 
consists of three different categories that represent varying degrees of sensitivity. Samples, i.e. groups, are assumed 
                                                   
16 See Appendix for individual histograms.  
17 See Appendix for individual Q-Q Plots.  
18 The Kruskal–Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks (named after William Kruskal and W. Allen Wallis) is a non-
parametric method for testing whether samples originate from the same distribution. It is used for comparing more than two 
samples that are independent, or not related. The parametric equivalent of the Kruskal-Wallis test is the one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). When the Kruskal-Wallis test leads to significant results, then at least one of the samples is different from 
the other samples. The test does not identify where the differences occur or how many differences actually occur. It is an 





to be independent because they do not have an effect on one another. Moreover, the Kruskal-Wallis test a sumes 
continuous distributions and allows for the comparison of more than two samples at the same time, which is also the 
case with my model because tariffs can assume any number and I have three distinct groups. Also, the Kruskal-
Wallis test allows for different sample sizes, whereby the shapes of samples have to be similar, which is also true for 
our model (see Appendix for histograms).  
Table 12: Ranks and Test Statistics  
Ranks   
Degree of Sensitivity N Mean Rank 
Non- Sensitive  162 127.1 
Sensitive  61 160.26 
Highly Sensitive  106 225.65 
Total 329   
 
Test Statistics  
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom  Asymp. Sig. 
100.146 2 0 
 
According to findings of the the Kruskal-Wallis tes, there is a statistically significant difference b tween the 
application of tariffs (H(2)=100.146, p=.0), with a mean rank of 127 for the non-sensitive group, 160.26 for  the 
sensitive group and 225.65 for highly sensitive group. Henceforth, I reject the null-hypothesis that tariffs are applied 
irrespective of degree of sensitivity and accept the alternative hypothesis, that tariffs are applied as a condition of 
sensitivity. The Kruskal-Wallis test only allows us to test whether there are statistically significant differences; 
however, it falls short of establishing where exactly these differences lie. In order to establish which groups are 
actually different from each other, deploy the Mann-Whitney U test.19 While the Kruskal-Wallis test is deployed 
when we have sample groups that are greater than two, the Mann-Whitney U test can be deployed to test differences 
between two groups only. Like the Kruskal-Wallis tet, the Mann-Whitney U test stipulates that our samples are 
                                                   
19 The Mann–Whitney U test (also called the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon (MWW), Wilcoxon rank-sum test, or Wilcoxon–Mann–
Whitney test) is a non-parametric test of the null hypothesis that two populations are the same against n alternative hypothesis, 
especially that a particular population tends to have l rger values than the other. The parametric equivalent of the Mann-Whitney 




independent, with at least ordinal measurement and distributions that are shaped the same, assumptions my ample 
fulfill.   
I test each combination of groups against each other, resulting in three overall tests. Conducting multiple 
comparisons leads to an increased possibility of committing a Type I error.20 To control for the increased likelihood 
of rejecting a true null-hypothesis, I readjust α via the Bonferroni correction.21 The Bonferroni correction is 
deployed, as opposed to other measures, because it is the most conservative one and yields most robust results.   
All three tests exhibit a statistically significant difference between groups being tested. The first test confirms that 
differences between the non-sensitive and sensitive group are statistically significant, U(241)=3944.00, Z=-3.711, 
p<.02. The second test confirms that there is a statistically significant difference between the groups non-sensitive 
and highly sensitive, U(266)=3443.50, Z=-9.93, p<.02. The third test confirms that there is a significant difference 
between the groups sensitive and highly sensitive, U(165)=1947.00, Z=-4.50, p<.02. Thus, I reject the null-
hypothesis, that tariffs are deployed irrespective of degree of sensitivity across groups and accept the alternative 
hypothesis that the deployment of tariffs is a condition of sensitivity across all categories.  
Table 13: Ranks and Test Statistics (Non-Sensitive And Sensitive Group)  
  
Degree of Sensitivity  N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Non-Sensitive  162 105.85 17147.00 
Sensitive 61 128.34 7829.00 
Total 223     
 
Test Statistics 
  Tariffs  
Mann-Whitney U 3944.000 
Wilcoxon W 17147.000 
Z -3.711 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
                                                   
20  The multiple comparisons, multiplicity or multiple testing problem occurs when one considers a set of statistical 
inferences simultaneously. Errors in inference, including confidence intervals that fail to include their corresponding population 
parameters or hypothesis tests that incorrectly reject the null hypothesis are more likely to occur when one considers the set as a 
whole. 





Table 14: Ranks and Test Statistics (Non-Sensitive And Highly Sensitive Groups) 
  N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Non-Sensitive 162 102.76 16646.50 
Highly Sensitive  106 183.01 19399.50 
Total 268     
 
  Tariffs 
Mann-Whitney U 3443.500 
Wilcoxon W 16646.500 
Z -9.928 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 
Table 15: Ranks and Test Statistics (Sensitive And Highly Sensitive Groups) 
  N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Sensitive 61 62.92 3838.00 
Highly Sensitive  106 96.13 10190.00 
Total 167     
 
  Tariffs 
Mann-Whitney U 1947.000 
Wilcoxon W 3838.000 
Z -4.501 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 
Model 2: NTMs  
Descriptive Statistics 
As with my first model, the second model consists of 330 cases, which are agricultural exports from South Africa to 
the EU at the HS-six digit level in the year 2011. The entire sample displays an overall range of NTMs of 42, r: 2-44 
(M=14.75, SD=5.34). Different groups vary in range, with the group non-sensitive displaying the largest range of 42 




are very similar with the non-sensitive group displaying a mean of 14.71 (SD= 6.71), the sensitive group displaying 
a mean of 14.21 (SD=5.19) and the highly sensitive group displaying a mean of 15.10 (SD= 3.41).  
 
Table 16: Descriptive Statistics NTMs (Total) 







NTMs 330 42 14.745 5.5397 -0.197 0.134 1.905 0.268 
Valid N  330               
 
 
Table 17: Descriptive Statistics NTMs (By Group)   
Degree of 
Sensitivity  








163 42 2 44 14.712 6.7079 0.018 0.19 1.07 0.378 
Sensitive  61 18 2 20 14.213 5.0961 -1.039 0.306 0.023 0.604 
Highly 
Sensitive  
106 20 2 22 15.104 3.4057 -0.472 0.235 1.57 0.465 
 
Analysis of individual histograms reveals that frequ ncy distributions of all three groups are bi-modal, isplaying a 
major and minor mode. To be rigorous in establishing that my data is non-normally distributed, I execut  Q-Q Plots 
for individual categories, which confirm the assumption that frequency distributions are non-normal. Having 
established non-normality, I execute a non-parametric test. Unlike with my first model, a Kruskal-Wallis test is not 
suitable to deploy because not all assumptions are met. The Kruskal-Wallis test assumes that the dependent variable 
follows a continuous distribution; however, with my second model my dependent variable, NTMs, follows a discrete 
one as only integers represent the variable. For that reason, I execute a slightly less powerful test, bu  the most 
appropriate one available to me, which is an extended median test.22 Thus, it is again possible to check if there are 
statistically significant differences in the application of NTMs when controlling for degree of sensitivity. Analysis of 
                                                   
22  An extended median test is a special case of Pearson's chi-squared test. It is a nonparametric test that ests the null 
hypothesis that the medians of the populations from which two or more samples are drawn are identical. The data in each sample 
are assigned to two groups, one consisting of data whose values are higher than the median value in the two groups combined, 
and the other consisting of data whose values are at the median or below. A Pearson's chi-squared test is then used to determine 





medians across categories reveals that they are the sam  with p>.05. Therefore, I retain the null-hypothesis that 
NTMs are deployed regardless of degree of sensitivity.  
Table 18: Hypothesis Test Summary 
Null Hypothesis  Test Sig. Decision  
The median of NTMs are the 
same across categories of Degree 
of Sensitivity.  
Independent Samples- 
Median Test 
0.63 Retain the null hypothesis.  
 
Results of the extended median test reveal that the degree of sensitivity has no impact on the application of NTMs 
and I accept the null hypothesis. The extended test of median differences provides insights into whether t e amount 
of NTMs applied to different commodities is the same; however, it cannot tell us about the type of NTM deployed. 
For that reason, I look in depth at the distribution of NTMs deployed by the EU in the given context by computing a 
contingency table (see Appendix V).  
There are in total 4805 NTMs applied to a selection of 330 product groups. However, in total there are only 40 
different NTMs applied across all product groups. Thus, the same NTMs are consistently applied to multiple product 
groups. According to the classification of NTMs by UNCTAD, 60% of NTMs deployed by the EU is related to SPS 
measures (category A). TBT measures (category B) are the second most prevalent group with 32% of measur s 
deployed relating to TBT. The deployment of measure other than TBT or SPS related, such as pre-shipment 
inspections (category C), non-automatic licensing ad quotas (category E), as well as finance measures (category G) 
are not widespread.  














Source: Author’s Compilation 
The group non-sensitive hosts the most NTMs, because it i  the largest, almost three times as large as the group 
sensitive and the group highly sensitive being roughly 35% smaller than the largest group (non-sensitive). To assess 
the distribution of types of NTMs across product groups, I account for the size of group by weighting hem. Analysis 
of the weighted values reveals that, indeed, the application of NTMs is very similar and irrespective of type of 
NTMs or degree of sensitivity. Analysis of the weighted averages of each NTM applied confirms that the same 
amount NTMs are applied to each product group, which is around 11.5 per product group at the HS-six digit level.  
Table 19: Weighted Averages of Application of NTMs by Category 
  Non-sensitive  Sensitive  Highly Sensitive  
SPS 11.61 11.92 11.48 
TBT 3.14 2.57 2.54 
Pre-Shipment Insp.  0 0 0.07 
Non-Automatic Licensing 0.08 0.03 0.11 
Financial 0.07 0.03 0.11 
Source: Author’s Compilation 
Analysis of Results  
Introduction  
Tariffs 
Dividing overall products into categories of sensitivity proves to be an appropriate tool to generate efined results 
about the role of tariffs and NTMS in the agricultural sector. Results of statistical tests reveal that t e deployment of 
tariffs is strategic, with highly sensitive commodities being subject to greater tariffs than sensitive and non-sensitive 
commodities.  I conclude that tariffs are used as ame ns of protectionism. Literature suggests that the application of 
tariffs in the agricultural sector is more predominant, when compared to other sectors, such as the manufacturing 
one. The finding that 68% of products are not subject to a tariff contradicts this assumption. Contrary to the findings 
of the literature review, the average tariff across all groups is extremely low, with 3.10%. However, the frequency 
distributions of tariffs are non-normal, which is why it is more appropriate to take the value of the m dian as a 
representation of tariffs. Due to the fact that 68% of products are not subject to a tariff, i.e. a tariff of 0%, the median 




As stated with the literature review, particularly sensitive products are protected by “megatariffs.” The large range 
of 0% to 63% of applied tariffs in my sample substantiates this finding. The occurrence of few megatariffs also 
explains the fact that there is such a low median and  slightly higher mean. Infrequent, but extremely high 
megatariffs cause an upward bias when computing a me n, which is not reflected when computing the median. In 
addition, within the categories non-sensitive and sensitive, 50% of commodities are subject to no tariffs at all. A 
similar picture is true for the group of highly senitive products, where 50% of commodities have a tariff lower than 
4% applied to them. These findings contradict the assumption that tariffs are applied extensively across product 
groups.  
This confirms my general assumption that there are large discrepancies in the application of tariffs and to understand 
the application of tariffs as a function of degree of sensitivity. The deployment of tariffs based on degree of 
sensitivity is consistent with theoretical assumptions outlined with the concept of the international food regime. 
Tariffs have been an integral part of EU trade policies to guard its domestic agricultural market and dvance 
advantages within this sector. As Friedmann (1982: 82) suggests, this has led to a stable pattern of production and 
re-production of power, which is slow and difficult to dismantle.  EU agricultural policies aim at thecontrolled ex- 
and import of products to maximize domestic net benefits. The majority of agricultural imports constitu es primary 
commodities are of no direct competition to domestic products and enters European markets without barriers. The 
few, but extremely important sectors, such as sugar and beef, which are of great domestic relevance to the EU, the 
EU protects extremely with carefully crafted policies. Thus, trade benefits and economic advantages are protected 
through a web of extensive and discriminatory trade barriers.  
The deployment of different methodologies is a powerful explanation as to why findings of my study differ so 
greatly from expectations raised with the literature review. Findings of the literature review state that the EU 
deploys extensive prohibitively high tariffs on products from the agricultural sector. Gozallet (2003: 1) finds that 
estimates of the average tariff applied by the EU within the agricultural sector range from 40% as the highest and 
10% as the lowest.  My findings are still lower with the average tariff being 3.81% on agricultural imports to the EU 
from South Africa. Tariffs issued with agricultural exports that are not part of EU imports from South Africa are 




The discrepancy of findings produced with the litera u e review and empirical ones computed with this study also 
stem from the fact that the majority of studies deploy ‘bound’ tariffs as a measure of calculating theimpact of tariffs 
as opposed to ‘applied’ tariffs. Bound tariffs reprsent the upper threshold to which a country is allowed to raise its 
tariff on an item, as committed under the GATT. However, I deploy ‘applied’ rates within my study. Applied rates, 
as opposed to bound rates, are the tariff rates customs administrations apply to imported goods. These rat s are 
generally considerably lower than bound rates, due to the fact that preferential trade agreements betwe n two or 
more partners exist (MAcMap Glossary). This is true for trade relations between the EU and South Africa, which are 
guided by a bilateral FTA. Thus, it becomes evident that studies disregarding the context of particular tr de 
agreements might contribute to the literature that exaggerates the prevalence of tariffs applied by the EU by using 
bound rates when looking at tariff flows in aggregat .  
An additional explanation is that South Africa does not export products with the highest tariffs to the EU, because 
the imposition of very high tariffs increases the price to such an extent that the commodity becomes uncompetitive. 
After all, the reason to issue tariffs is to deter imports from third parties. As shown with Table 21, product groups, 
such as bovine (107%), are subject to the highest tariffs and are at the same time not exported by South Africa to the 
EU. When analyzing product groups with the highest tariffs (top ten), South Africa only exports products two 
products, products of the sugar sector and bovine cuts.  
This is consistent with assumptions of the international food regime and substantiates the account that tariffs 
deployed by the EU have the capacity to completely d ter agricultural exports from South Africa. According to 
Friedmann (1982: 79), the postwar international food regime is about international trade in food and agriculture. The 
implicit and explicit administration of the food regime regulates trade flows and underpins the current balance of 
power. The EU, with the help of the US, constitutes one of the most important trading blocs across the globe and 
reflects its dominant position in policies shaped with the WTO, which have direct consequences on its 
administration of tariffs and ultimately ex- and imports. South Africa,  a power yielding less influenc d on an 
international trade scale than the EU, has to make do with policies, i.e. tariffs, dictated by the EU and condition 






Table 20: Highest Tariffs Deployed By EU (Top Ten) 
Product code Product description Tariff Applied 
20629 Frozen edible bovine offal (excl. tongues and livers) 106.70% 
20230 Frozen, boneless meat of bovine animalsLo 83% 
20110 Carcases or half-carcases of bovine animals, fresh or c illed 71.40% 
170250 Fructose, chemically pure 71% 
20210 Frozen bovine carcases and half-carcases 68.60% 
40590 
Fats and oils derived from milk, and dehydrated butter and ghee 
(excl. natural butter, recombined butter and whey butter) 
66% 
20220 








Fresh or chilled bovine cuts, with bone in (excl. carcases and 
1/2 carcases) 
58.40% 
Source: TRAINS Database. Author’s Visualization  
Analysis of NTMs  
This is in contrast to what the results of the stati tical tests reveal in regards to the deployment of NTMs. I show that 
NTMs are deployed irrespective of their degree of sensitivity, which contradicts findings of the literature review. All 
commodities are subject to at least two NTMs at a time, covering 100% of commodities. This finding comes as no 
surprise as health and safety, as well as quality assur nce, is guaranteed via regulations and standards, i.e. NTMs. 
Given findings of the literature review, I expected o find that the application of NTMs, similar to the application of 
tariffs, would be based on the degree of sensitivity. However, this was found to be incorrect as each commodity 
group is subject to the same amount of NTMs, which are 15 on average. This means that highly sensitive commodity 
groups are not protected to a greater degree by NTMs than non-sensitive commodities.  
Dell’Aquilla (2007: 270) raises the concern that disputes surround the necessity of NTMs and that it is difficult to 
establish which NTMs are deployed out of necessity and which are issued with the sole purpose of deterring 
imports. My study finds that the EU deploys NTMs indiscriminately; however, it lacks the scope to determine 




NTMs. Due to the fact that NTMs are deployed in the same fashion across product groups, I argue that they are not 
used in a protectionist fashion. The majority of commodities in question are not subject to any tariffs, thus, the EU 
reveals no immediate interest in deterring regular imports of commodities that are not subject to stringent internal 
regulation. For that reason, I argue that the uniform application of NTMs across categories reflects non-protectionist 
policies. The deployment of tariffs is one of the most efficient way to manage imports of third parties and 
Friedmann (1982: 82) states that the dismantling of established rules only takes place at a slow pace, with infrequent 
interruptions or accelerations caused by periods of crisis. Thus, I provide a credible explanation as to why, contrary 
to the findings of the literature review, NTMs do nt substitute the deployment of tariffs as a protectionist method.  
Comparison of NTMs and Tariffs 
Tests confirm that tariffs remain the largest obstacles to greater South African agricultural exports to the EU when 
compared to NTMs. The literature review suggests that NTMs become greater obstacles to imports than tariffs, but I 
refute this assumption with my analysis. In contrast, my analysis establishes that far from it, tariffs remain the most 
effective policy tool to deter imports. The agricultural sector is one of the most stringently protected sectors, yet 
average tariffs on exports from South Africa to theEU amount to only 3.81%, which is relatively low compared to 
estimates put forward by the literature review. With the agricultural sector being of such sensitive nature and tariffs 
remaining comparably low, I assume that tariffs applied within different sectors would remain low when comparing 
average tariff rate.  
However, the literature review suggests that there is a trend occurring, which sees the shift from tariffs being used as 
protectionist measures to NTMs.  Establishing a longitudinal perspective on the development of tariffs and NTMs 
goes beyond the scope of my study, which is why this trend might be indeed taking place. Yet, my study illustrates 
that this trend cannot be confirmed when looking at the context of agricultural exports from South Africa to the EU. 
The literature review proposes that the agricultura sector is one of the most resilient when it comes to the 
dismantling of tariffs. Thus, results of my study might not be replicated when comparing tariffs and NTMs within 
different sectors, such as the manufacturing or primary commodity sectors. Also, results might differ when 
analyzing exporters to the EU, which have no preferential trade agreements, such as an FTA, in place with the EU. 
Unless the country is one of the least developed ones (LDCs), exports of countries with no special trade rrangement 




The Role of Private Standards as an Entry Point for Future Research  
Friedmann (1982: 81) states that the international food regime is not only subject to rules and standards issued by 
the state but also by private actor, such as agrofood corporations. This is in accordance with the argument I put 
forward with this study, which proposes that private s andards are playing a more and more important role in the 
management of agricultural trade and should be considered as alternative mechanisms to regulate exports fr m third 
parties. Seeking to offer a critical perspective on the global governance of the international food regime, I highlight 
the role of private standards in exercising power over agricultural value chains. The concept of “private authority”, 
as developed by Hall and Biersteker (2002) is used to illustrate how private standards re-configure thglobal 
governance of agricultural trade, as presupposed with the concept of the international food regime.   
Private standards, like public ones, are standards that are put in place to guarantee that products are s fe to consume 
or to use for further value-adding activities. Similar to discussions on the impact of public standards, debates 
assessing the role of private standards on farmers in developing countries also take place. Here, analysis of the 
literature review confirms the same controversy surrounding private standards as public standards on the impact of 
the issuance of standards. Private standards have te potential to act as a catalyst to exports becaus consumers and 
businesses understand that products are safe, or they might act as a disadvantage due to the fact that they raise 
compliance costs, which potentially prohibits entry to markets all together (Aerni 2013: 5, Liu 2009: 1). Regardless, 
the scope of this study does excludes a detailed assessment on arguments of advantages and disadvantages; but it 
focuses on illustrating how far the deployment of private standards can be understood within the wider political 
economy of a global food regime.  
 
Private standards become increasingly authoritative and on par with the importance of public standards. They 
reconfigure fiscal space, i.e. competencies that are historically and exclusively linked to the state, towards private 
authority, which deflects conventional notions of accountability, legitimacy and transparency, unlike public 
authority. Instead, non-state actors exercising private authority convey some form of accorded legitimacy (Hall and 
Biersteker 2002: 4). In the case of private standard setting, this legitimately is inferred by agrofood corporations 





Unlike public standards, private standards can be issued by a variety of actors. Not-for-profit NGOs, for-profit 
NGOs and businesses issue standards directly (Liu 2009: 5). The legitimacy of private standards is questioned 
because stakeholders, other than agrofood corporations, have no input in designing them (von Hagen and Alvarez 
2012: 19). Thus, distant organizations judge on matters such as sustainability and ecology without the input of local 
farmers (von Hagen and Alvarez 2012: 19). Within this narrative, values highly desirable by consumers pertaining 
to “organic” or “sustainable” are constructed according to standards that agrofood companies, as opposed to 
stakeholders within the immediate context, set (Henson and Humphrey 2009: 3).  Thus, power exercised by 
agrofood companies leads to the consolidation of control over global value chains by agrofood corporati ns. The 
monopolization of regulations pertaining to trade in agriculture is a key aspect when using the method of the 
international food regime.  
Furthermore, the state and consumers recognize authorship of standard setting as legitimate. For that m ter, private 
authority exercised by agrofood corporations enables th m to “set agendas, establish boundaries or limits for actions, 
they certify, they guarantee contracts, they provide order and security” (Hall and Biersteker 2002: 4). Authority, 
here understood as “the institutionalized forms of expression of power” (Hall and Biersteker 2002: 4), grants 
agrofood corporations the legitimacy to absorb competencies that relate to the regulation of agriculture and food, 
ultimately “unhinging” the global food regime from state sanctioned policies all together.  
 
Private standards compete with existing structures, such as the TBT or SPS agreement, because they lack standard 
setting accountability like that of intergovernmental standards. Intergovernmental standards are subject to oversight 
by the WTO and can be legally challenged via its Dipute Settlement Mechanism (Liu 2009: 13). The same cannot 
be said for private standards, which are not subject to any regulatory body, but businesses remain essentially only 
accountable to the shareholder. Private institutions are thus ill-equipped to legitimately administer standards, as the 
danger of conflicts of interest compromising judgments on the necessity and objective of private standards issued is 
paramount.   
 
Compliance with standards increase revenues along the entire value chain, but these distributions are spread 
unevenly, with businesses as private standard setting bodies benefitting the most proportionally (von Hagen and 




supplier of the products (Aerni 2013: 5). In line with assumptions made under the political economy of fo d 
regimes, power exercised by agrofood corporations becomes consolidated with the integration of global value chains 
(Henson and Humphrey 2009: 3). In accordance with assumptions of the international food regime, Friedmann 
(1982: 80) cites that the increasing industrialization and monopolization of agrofood corporations takes place with 
the inherent extension of control of regulations of trade in the agricultural sector, which is evident with the issuance 
of private standards.  
Apart from the increased monopolization of global vue chains, the issuance of private standards creates wider 
challenges in regards to the global governance of fo d and agriculture. This is inherent with the fact that private 
standards are deployed as a governance tool beyond the state (von Hagen and Alvarez 2012: 18). While private 
standards are technically voluntary ones, they are de facto becoming mandatory as non-compliance is not a  option 
for farmers, or other relevant businesses, due to lack of demand from potential alternative parties (Liu 2009: 2).  
Potential for Future Research 
Future research should account for the impact of tariffs and especially of NTMs, as this is not possible with an 
inventory approach as deployed with this study. Moreover, future research should pay greater attention to deploying 
applied tariffs as opposed to bound rates as these vary largely. Deploying bound rates as a measurement 
indiscriminately results in the deployment of higher tariffs within models computed and thus might lead to ill-
informed long-term policy recommendations. Furthermore, more research should also focus on measuring positive 
effects that regulations and standard might cause, as opposed to only negative ones. Findings of my study reveal that 
NTMs are deployed in a non-strategic fashion and thus offer great opportunity for exporters to create confidence in 
their products by international consumers.  
My study focuses on a cross-sectional study at a single point in time; however, research should also concentrate on 
longitudinal studies in order to be able to account for changes over time. A longitudinal approach also allows for the 
identification of trends in the application of tariffs and NTMs in a historical context. Instead of looking at the effects 
of tariffs and NTMs in isolation, future research should focus on analyzing joint, or interaction, effects that might be 
created with the application of NTMs and tariffs. Thus, it would be possible to establish whether tariffs and NTMs 
are deployed as a single mechanism, instead of two separate policy tools to deter sensitive imports from third 
parties.  
55 
My study has not confirmed the wide-spread use of NTMs as protectionist tools by the EU in the context of 
agricultural exports from South Africa, yet NTMs are cited as having a major effect on capacities of less developed 
countries to export commodities to the EU. My paper deploys a definition of NTMs that does not take into account 
‘beyond the border’ effects of exporting countries. However, given the fact that NTMs are deployed out of necessity 
and not due to protectionist intentions, the questions remains as to why NTMs are perceived as particularly trade 
impeding. This merits the assumption that NTMs are perceived as obstacles to trade because specifically developing 
countries lack capacities to process requirements effectively. Future research should investigate a twofold approach 
to tackling NTM related shortcomings. On the one hand, EU customs procedures should be streamlined in order to 
facilitate the processing of exports of third parties destined for the EU. On the other hand, resources should be 
allocated to strengthen technical capacities of developing countries to process exports proficiently once EU custom 
borders are reached.  
Summary 
My study uses the concept of the international food regime as a method to illustrate that power exercised within the 
global governance of agricultural trade has historically been linked to protectionist measures by developed countries, 
such as the EU. Taking agricultural exports from South Africa to the EU as case study, I show that NTMs are not 
used as protectionist tools by the EU. Tariffs, on the other hand, remain heavily deployed in order to deter imports 
from third parties. This finding is contrary to results expected by the literature review. Discrepancies in regards to 
results relating to the relevance of the issuance of NTMs are explained by the fact I used a methodology that was 
contextualized, as opposed to indiscriminate aggregate data.  Moreover, results produced with my quantitative 
analysis are in line with the overall framework of the global food regime. As illustrated with my qualitative 
argument, NTMs issued by the state constitute mere minimum standards. My argument demonstrates that a purely 
state-centric view on the analysis of tariffs and NTMs on agricultural trade, or general trade more broadly, fails to 
account for the burgeoning importance of private authority. The global governance of agricultural trade thus needs 
to be redressed by including the role of power exercised beyond the state. This is an important perspective to 





Appendix I:  Overview of Most Common Methods to Account for NTMs 
Method Description Strength Limitation 
Gravity Model   Measures trade impact in 
terms of welfare effects 
Quantification of NTMs 
possible 
Does not distinguish between 
effects of tariffs and NTMs 
Price- Wedge 
Method   
Measures trade impact by 
modeling tariff equivalents of 
NTMs, deploying domestic 
prices compared to 
international ones  
Measuring trade impact  Domestic products and imports are 
usually not perfect substitutes  
Inventory-
Approach  
Catalogues NTMs in place 
via accumulation of data on 
regulations, data on 
frequencies and detention, 
data on complaints from 
industry  
Directing attention to 
frequency of NTMs in 
disputed sectors, indicate 
importance of problem  




Surveys exporting companies 
in regards to import 
difficulties 
Highlights issue areas of 
qualitative importance; 
Rankings of importance of 
NTMs 
No quantification of NTMs   
Source: Author’s own, Synthesis of Literature Review  
 
Appendix II:  Overview of Studies in Regards to Effects of Tariffs and NTMs 
Author Study Method Findings 
Tokarick (2003) 
Effect of imports and 
domestic subsidies on 
global welfare effects, 
imposed by OECD 
countries  
Partial- and General 
Equilibrium Theory  
Import tariffs are greater 
cause for distortion of 
welfare effects than 
domestic subsidies  
Gibson (2006)  
Profiling agricultural 
tariffs globally in the year 
2001 
Cataloguing bound and 
applied tariffs of product 
groups, comparing 
frequency statistics as well 
as central tendency 
EU and US have lowest 
overall agricultural tariffs; 
dairy, meat and sugar 
sectors are subject to 
‘megatariffs’ worldwide  
Hoekman et al 
(2003) 
Impact of tariffs and 
domestic subsidies on 
agricultural exports by 
developed countries on 
developing countries 
Partial-Equilibrium of 
global trade in 
commodities that benefit 
from domestic border 
support or export 
Reducing tariffs by 50% 
has larger positive effect 
on developing countries’ 




exports subsidies.  domestic subsidies by 50%  
Love et al (2009) 
Lobbying for the abolition 
of tariffs and quotas 
Qualitative study of 
arguments on why global 
trade liberalization is 
beneficial 
Greater abolition of tariffs 
and quotas leads to greater 
global welfare gains, 
countries temporarily 




Ngqangweni, S.;   
Kirsten, J.F. 
(2007) 
Effect of SPS regulations 
on South African Food 
Exports to Ireland, Italy, 
Sweden, 
Germany and USA 
 Gravity Model  
SPS measures have severe 
restraining effect on South 
African food exports  
Otsuki, T.;  
Wilson, J.S.;  
Sewadeh, M. 
(2001) 
Impact of changes in 
aflatoxin standards on 
trade flows of groundnut 
products from Africa to 
EU, 1989- 1998 
Gravity Model  
10% tighter aflatoxin 
standards will reduce 
imports by 11%; new EU 
regulations, which are 
tighter than international 
standards, will lead 63% 
lower trade flows of 
groundnuts 
Bellanawithana et al  
(2009) 
Comparison of impact of 
NTMs on agricultural 
exports from eight South 
Asian countries to its 32 
main exports markets  
Gravity Model  
Agricultural trade between 
developed countries is 
characterized by NTMs, 
exports from developing 
countries to developed 
countries face greater tariff 
obstacles than NTMs   
Nogues et al 
(1986) 
Analysis of NTMs to 
sixteen industrial 
countries’ imports, period 
1981-1983 
Computing coverage ratios 
of imports affected by 
NTMs cross-sectional 
analysis of all product 
types  
27% of all imports and 
34% of imports from 
developing countries are 
affected by NTMs, usage 
of NTMs is on the rise  
Fontagné et al 
 (2005) 
Analysis of NTMs relating 
to the environment proxied 
by SPS and TBT measures 
notified to the WTO, 
taking data from 2001 
Computing coverage ratios 
environmentally necessary 
NTMs and protectionist 
NTMs disguised as 
environmental protection, 
cross-sectional analysis of 
all product types  
88% of imports are 
affected by environmental 
NTMs, 39% are deployed 
as protectionist measures  
Moenius, J.  
(2004) 
Effect of shared standards 
on bilateral trade flows, 
covering 471 industries, 
1980- 1995 
Econometric analysis of 
shared and unilateral 
standards and its effects on 
bilateral trade flows  
Standards have negative 
impact on agricultural 
sector, but positive impact 
on manufacturing sector 
Henson et al  
(2001) 
Effect of SPS measures on 
developing countries’ 
exports to the US  
Compare food standards of 
the US and EU  
SPS standards are major 
factor in reducing ability 
of developing countries to 





Walkenhorst (2004)  
Prevalence of NTMs faced 
by EU exporters 
Inventory of business 
complaints filed with the 
European Commission 
(EC) 
EU exporters face greatest 
NTMs in agri-food sector 
when exporting to high-
income countries  
Source: Author’s Own, Synthesis of Literature Review   


































Sen.  Total  
A120 Geographical restrictions on eligibility 35 1 31 67 
A130 Systems Approach 114 47 68 229 
A150 Registration requirements for importers 123 59 69 251 
A190 Prohibitions or restrictions of products or substances because of SPS reasons n.e.s. 58 28 22 108 
A210 Tolerance limits for residues of or contamination by certain substances 132 48 95 275 
A220 Restricted use of certain substances in foods and feeds 121 47 69 237 
A310 LabelingLabeling requirements 117 48 94 259 
A320 Marking requirements 31 0 23 54 
A330 Packaging requirements 31 0 48 79 
A400 Hygienic requirements 20 1 31 52 
A410 Microbiological criteria on the final product 114 47 92 253 
A420 Hygienic practices during production 114 47 68 229 
A600 Other requirements on production or post-production processes 3 0 0 3 
A630 Food and feed processing 125 48 71 244 
A640 Storage and transport conditions 7 0 1 8 
A700 
Regulation of foods or feeds derived from, or produced using genetically modified 
organisms (GMO) 
130 53 96 279 
A820 Testing requirement 3 0 0 3 
A830 Certification requirement 80 35 42 157 
A840 Inspection requirement 64 29 37 130 
A850 Traceability information requirements 120 48 66 234 
A851 Origin of materials and parts 107 47 63 217 
A852 Processing history 114 47 68 229 
A853 Distribution and location of products after delivery 107 47 63 217 
B110 Prohibition for TBT reasons 35 0 8 43 
B140 Authorization requirement for TBT reasons 134 62 98 294 
B150 Registration requirement for importers for TBT reasons 31 0 8 39 
B210 Tolerance limits for residues of or contamination by certain substances 1 0 0 1 
B220 Restricted use of certain substances 5 0 0 5 
B310 Labeling requirements 157 62 99 318 
B320 Marking requirements 14 14 5 33 
64 
B330 Packaging requirements 35 0 36 71 
B700 Product quality or performance requirement 41 19 7 67 
B820 Testing requirement 16 0 0 16 
B840 Inspection requirement 31 0 8 39 
B850 Traceability information requirements 4 0 0 4 
B853 Distribution and location of products after delivery 1 0 0 1 
C400 
Import monitoring and surveillance requirements and other automatic licensing 
measures 
0 0 7 7 
E100 Non-automatic license 13 2 12 27 
G110 Advance import deposit 12 2 12 26 
Total  2400 888 1517 4805 
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